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ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the open-source and
antiexpansionist rhetoric of current intellectual-property debates
is a revolution of surface rhetoric but not of deep structure. What
this Article terms “the Access Movements” are, by now, wellknown communities devoted to providing more access to
intellectual-property-protected goods, communities such as the
Open Source Initiative and Access to Knowledge. This Article
engages Movement actors in their critique of the balance struck by
recent law (statutes and cases) and asks whether new laws that
further restrict access to intellectual property “promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.” Relying on cases, statutes
and recent policy debates, this Article contrasts the language of
traditional intellectual-property law (origins and exclusivity) with
the new language of the Access Movements (antiorigins and
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access). The Article compares the language of the Access
Movements to that of sociopolitical movements of the past, and it
draws lessons for successful and unsuccessful uses of rhetoric to
enact social change. The Article concludes by showing how the
language of the Access Movements retains certain core elements of
the intellectual-property regime to which it is reacting and
investigates whether this is an effective strategy (whether or not a
conscious one) to stimulate change.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a movement afoot among lawyers and advocates
concerning intellectual-property protection. Indeed, there are several
related movements afoot. James Boyle is credited with calling out the

12/30/2010 8:34:29 PM

2010]

COMPARATIVE TALES

197

Second Enclosure Movement.1 On his heels (and even before), groups
organized to provide open access to innovation and expression.2
Without presuming direct causality, it seems fair to say that these
related movements, which this Article will collectively call the
Access Movements, are a response to the expansion of intellectualproperty rights (building fences statutorily or on a case-by-case basis)
and a growing digital culture that disseminates information and
expression broadly and quickly (breaking down fences). In a
networked world where information and expression are only a click
away, most users of the Internet recognize how much knowledge and
culture (in the form of patented inventions, trademarks, or
copyrighted works) are not free to use.3 For the most part, the Access
Movements do not advocate dismantling the intellectual-property
system. They do, however, advocate preserving a meaningful public
domain and creating a robust commons by loosening the boundaries
of intellectual-property protection and reshaping the norms of
intellectual-property control. The Access Movements do this to serve
the purposes of intellectual property—to promote science and the
useful arts4—and nourish participatory democracy.5
1 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 33 (2003) (developing the vocabulary and analytic
framework necessary to articulate the arguments against the enclosure of the public domain).
2 See, e.g., About EFF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/about (last
visited Oct. 30, 2010) (describing the founding of the Electronic Frontier Foundation in 1990);
About FEPP, FREE EXPRESSION POL‘Y PROJECT, http://fepproject.org/fepp/aboutfepp.html (last
updated Sept. 27, 2010) (describing the founding of the Free Expression Policy Project in 2000);
About FSF, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., http://www.fsf.org/about (last visited Oct. 30, 2010)
(describing the founding of the Free Software Foundation in 1985); About, STUDENTS FOR FREE
CULTURE, http://freeculture.org/about (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (describing the founding of
Students for Free Culture in 2004); BUDAPEST OPEN ACCESS INITIATIVE, http://www.
soros.org/openaccess/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (describing the Budapest Open
Access Initiative in 2001 sponsored by the Open Society Institute); History, CREATIVE
COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/History (last modified Sept. 27, 2010, 9:35 PM)
(describing the beginnings of Creative Commons in 2002). This is obviously not an exhaustive
list.
3 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, at xiv (2004) (―[W]e come from a tradition of
‗free culture‘—not ‗free‘ as in ‗free beer‘ (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the freesoftware movement), but ‗free‘ as in ‗free speech,‘ ‗free markets,‘ ‗free trade,‘ ‗free enterprise,‘
‗free will,‘ and ‗free elections.‘ A free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It
does this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so indirectly by limiting
the reach of those rights, to guarantee that follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as
possible from the control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property, just as a
free market is not a market in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
‗permission culture‘—a culture in which creators get to create only with the permission of the
powerful, or of creators from the past.‖ (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 8–9 (arguing that the
protectionist movement against Internet-driven accessibility enhancements has created less of a
free culture, and more of a permission culture).
4 The argument from the Access Movements, which will be discussed more infra, is that
overprotection of intellectual property creates a permissions culture in which the essential
borrowing from past innovations and creative works is chilled and future innovation and
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On the surface, this ―countermobilization‖—what some have
called a ―new politics of intellectual property‖6—is a story about
distributive justice. And this makes sense. Much of intellectualproperty law is designed to balance the societal benefits with the
burdens of monopolizing a good.7 Recent Movement memes such as
―Access to Knowledge‖ (A2K) and ―biopiracy‖ critique the balance
struck in our current system, and highlight the negative welfare
effects of overprotecting intellectual property.8 But below the surface,
the Access Movements‘ tale of distributive justice is more complex.
As a story, its moral is not simply ―redistribute‖—give more to the
users who are in need. Instead, it asserts the primacy of certain values

creative works are thereby stifled. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 5–6
(2001) (arguing that a failure to recognize and challenge the protectionist movement will hinder
innovation of Internet entrepreneurs, authors, or more generally, artists).
5 See, e.g., About CDD, CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (Mar. 2, 2007, 9:27 PM),
http://www.democraticmedia.org/about_cdd (describing the Center for Digital Democracy‘s
commitment to promoting the public interest in digital communications); About the CDT,
CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., http://cdt.org/about (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (describing
the CDT‘s mission to ―conceptualize, develop, and implement public policies that will keep the
Internet open, innovative and free‖); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net:
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 752–53 (2003) (discussing
the potential role of Internet-legal discourse in furthering Habermas‘s goal of legitimating the
rulemaking system through enabling meaningful participation by all those affected by the
decisions); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395 (2000) (criticizing a self-regulated
cyberspace as harmful to the promotion and protection of democratic ideals).
6 E.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008); Pamela Samuelson, Toward a New Politics of
Intellectual Property, COMMS. OF THE ACM, Mar. 2001, at 98.
7 Distributive justice is sometimes defined as ―normative principles designed to guide the
allocation of the benefits and burdens of economic activity.‖ Distributive Justice, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive (last revised Mar. 5,
2007). But there are intellectual-property theorists who assert a moral right to ownership of selfderived works of expression and innovation, despite the effect of that ownership on others. See,
e.g., Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 259 (2006) (―Intellectual property
utilitarianism does not ask who makes the goods or whether the goods are fairly distributed to
all who need them.‖); id. at 284 (discussing the flaws of the utilitarian approach to intellectual
property).
8 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPs and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities,
Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 155, 170 (2006) (―The current imbalances in scientific and technological capacity and the
distribution of short-term benefits of TRIPs [the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights] have contributed to the opposition to TRIPs in the Third World.
Part of the opposition to TRIPs is evident in the development of narratives of appropriation in
which the uses of resources of the South are characterized as misappropriation or even
‗biopiracy.‘‖ (footnote omitted)); Kapczynski, supra note 6, at 824–28 (discussing how the A2K
groups mobilized to contest aspects of the TRIPS Agreement, such as exclusive rights in seed
stocks and medicines needed in developing nations); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having
Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50
J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 113 (2003) (critiquing overprotection of access to works by
copyright owners as out of balance with the rest of copyright law).
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over others: the importance of community and of leveling hierarchies.
The Access Movements‘ mantra is not a facile reaction to the
expansion of intellectual-property protection by saying, ―let the
intellectual property be free.‖ The Access Movements, in their
reconstitution of intellectual-property norms, still embrace ownership
and exclusion, but they also challenge fundamental baselines of
intellectual property—such as the defaults of market freedom,
exclusivity of title, and individual ownership—as being in need of
updating for our new digital world. This Article excavates this more
complex story by analyzing the community that the Access
Movements create through their critiques and proposals concerning
the division of property and power in our networked world.
To this end, this Article is descriptive. It uncovers and then
compares the narrative justification for traditional intellectualproperty rights with the counternarrative of the Access Movements.
The Article is also normative. At its conclusion, the Article will
question the efficacy of the Access Movements‘ rhetoric as
insufficiently self-conscious of its failure to discard the language of
the past. It will show how, in the main, the Access Movements do
fundamentally change the language and distributional values of
intellectual property. But it will also show how even the most radical
voices in the Access Movements reinscribe into their narrative
justifications for property the liberal legal commitments of idealized
autonomy and consent. The upshot will be that, for all the reactionary
rhetoric, the Access Movements do not go as far as other
revolutionary movements have gone in transforming the discourse of
legal entitlements from exclusion to access. A close reading of the
Access Movements‘ rhetoric and recent case law demonstrates, on the
one hand, an ambiguity that threatens the Access Movements‘
coherence and, on the other hand, a reinscription of core features of
traditional intellectual-property law. In its conclusion, this Article
explores whether, in light of past social-reform movements,
discarding or revolutionizing the language of traditional intellectualproperty law is necessary to facilitate a sea change in our intellectualproperty relations.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly discusses the
range of voices employed by the Access Movements; it defines the
varying meanings of ―access‖ to which the Movements are dedicated.
It will then move to an exposition of the most radical positions on the
spectrum within the Movements. It does so to investigate whether the
antidote to the Second Enclosure Movement tells a different story
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than (and therefore enacts a different politics from) the traditional
justification for intellectual property.
After mapping the various meanings of ―access,‖ Part II introduces
the narrative structure of the dominant explanations for intellectualproperty protection. These narratives are origin stories, an identifiable
story genre that glorifies and valorizes enchanted moments of
individual creation, discovery or identity in order to justify
exclusivity and monopoly.9 As Part II will show, these origin stories
of intellectual property serve as heuristics, explaining the political,
economic, and social hierarchies that result from the legal ordering
affected by intellectual property protection. These heuristics sound in
liberal legal politics (possessive individualism).10 Unconscious or
unspoken, these origin stories hide the manner in which repeat players
and higher-status innovators disparately benefit from intellectualproperty law. 11 And because these narratives are compelling (they are
such good stories), they persuade us that the difference between the
haves and have-nots regarding intellectual-property protection are
―natural‖ or inevitable. As such, the origin stories justify the
continued disparity in access to wealth and power stemming from
intellectual-property law that is built upon concepts of individual
ownership and the productive power of excludability.12
Part III investigates the rhetoric and substantive goals of the
Access Movements. If our dominant intellectual-property regimes are
modeled on origin stories to justify exclusion, and the Access
Movements are fairly defined as countermobilizations to the
expansion of intellectual-property entitlements, the Access
9 See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. M ASON
L. REV. 319 (2008) (explaining how intellectual-property protection is grounded, in part, in
narrative theory).
10 See Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1027–28
(2009) (describing property law‘s ―ownership model‖ as the ―paradigm of liberal individualism‖
and an alternative as a ―focus on peoplehood vis-à-vis personhood inspire[ing] us to look
beyond the static forbearance of possessive individualism that finds such forceful expression in
traditional models of property‖).
11 In this way, they function ideologically by hiding their contingent nature. See Susan S.
Silbey, Ideology, Power, and Justice (―Studies of legal ideology are analyses of law‘s
complicity with power. . . . [T]he term ‗ideology‘ generally points to the ability of ideas to affect
social circumstances. Thus sociologists have sometimes described the function of ideology as
the capacity to advance the political and economic interests of groups or classes . . . .‖), in
JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 272, 272 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds.,
1998).
12 ―The goal of telling stories in law is not to entertain, or to terrify, or to illuminate life,
as it usually is with storytelling outside the legal culture. The goal of storytelling in law is to
persuade an official decisionmaker that one‘s story is true, to win the case, and thus to invoke
the coercive force of the state on one‘s behalf.‖ Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the
Law, in LAW‘S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2, 5 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996).
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Movements should rehearse antiorigin rhetoric that instantiates
contrary values of sharing and equality. The question is whether they
do. To what extent is this countermobilization a revolution in form
and substance? How much change are the Access Movements
proposing, and is there any evidence that the new language is working
to change outcomes in actual cases? Part III will answer these
questions by further elucidating the meaning of ―access‖ in light of its
corollaries and opposites (e.g., ―openness‖ and ―exclusivity‖). It does
so in the context of recently litigated disputes, emerging and novel
property relations, and newly founded organizations devoted to access
and innovation. These examples will show how both the language and
substantive agenda of the Access Movements reject some parts of the
origin stories described in Part II. A new language of property
emerges, built on the old one, that values relation over exclusivity,
group-oriented productivity over individual creation, and equality of
access over uninhibited alienability.
Part IV shows how, despite this change in surface rhetoric and
shift in narrative focus from origin to community, the Access
Movements remain committed to core principles of liberal political
theory. Idealizations of autonomy and consent play central roles in the
origin stories of intellectual property, and they continue to feature
prominently in the Access Movements‘ discourse. In light of this, Part
IV questions whether the Access Movements can convincingly
differentiate their proposals and politics (through the stories they tell)
from the intellectual-property regimes they critique. Simply put, can
the Access Movements effect change if they fail to modulate these
central features of the origin myths of intellectual property?
By drawing on other socio-legal reform movements of the
twentieth century, Part IV explores the connection between changing
rhetoric and changing socio-legal relations. In particular, it poses
three possible outcomes to the Access Movements‘ rhetoric of
change. The first is that changing the language we use can effect
change. On this theory, language is constitutive of our community
and changing our language from one of individuality to community,
from exclusivity to sharing, can successfully alter the way we think
and act towards each other and property. This might require
expunging the Access Movements of vestigial values of liberal
legalism. Part IV discusses historical examples of failed attempts at
this kind of total and abrupt change. The second outcome is to change
the stories we tell, but still retain core principles from the past. New
stories that reinscribe a few traditional values, while discarding
others, allow for incremental change that may be more sustainable
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over the long run. But, they may not lead to change sufficient to
achieve the redistribution the Access Movements seek. This appears
to be the way of the Access Movements, whether conscious or
unconscious. Again, this Part describes historical examples of social
movements that took this form and have been deemed successful by
some and incomplete by others. What we can learn from these two
different ways—and whether there is a third way—is the final
question this Article raises.
Excavating the complex stories of distributive justice told by the
Access Movements accomplishes several goals. A narrative approach
to understanding the law tends to be liberating and freedom
enhancing. Scrutinizing deep narrative structure unlocks assumptions
embedded in abstract schemes and unsettles established relations of
power.13 In light of the Access Movements‘ claims to maximize
freedom,14 a narrative approach to better understand the Access
Movements makes sense. Moreover, the study of narrative is the
study of culture.15 Insofar as we seek a better understanding of the
culture that is sought and constituted by these countermobilizations,
discovering the narratives therein will clarify the Movements‘
contours.16 Finally, this Article shows that particular features of
intellectual-property origin stories still shape the Access Movements‘
rhetoric and substantive agenda. Despite their claims of difference
from traditional intellectual-property law, this Article illuminates
some of the stumbling blocks to the Access Movements‘ success,

13 See Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales:
Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 197, 199 (1995) (arguing that
narrative scholarship is liberatory and that it can unsettle power).
14 See Boyle, supra note 1, at 57–58 (defining freedom in the information age); LESSIG,
supra note 4, at 12 (describing the debate between controlled and free access to resources).
15 See Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality (―To raise
the question of the nature of narrative is to invite reflection on the very nature of culture . . . .‖),
in ON NARRATIVE 1, 1 (W. J. T. Mitchell ed., 1980).
16 Professor Julie Cohen has written that the success of a political movement requires at
least two things: ―do the science‖ (produce detailed descriptions of cultural environment the
movement seeks to obtain) and ―generate a normative theory[,] . . . a story about what makes
th[e cultural] environment [that this movement creates] good.‖ Julie E. Cohen, Network Stories,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 91, 91. Feminist inquiry does both by excavating the
stories (e.g., testimonies) of women‘s lives to discern what has gone wrong and based on those
stories propose what should be done to do right. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 241 (1989) (―The first task of a movement for social change is
to face one‘s situation and name it. . . . Feminism on its own terms has begun to give voice to
and describe the collective condition of women as such . . . .‖); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Law’s
Stories as Reality and Politics (―[S]torytelling—bearing witness, giving account as we know
and practice it—took shape within civil rights movements. Since 1968 the women‘s liberation
movement has contributed distinctively to this tradition through its speakouts and
consciousness-raising.‖), in LAW‘S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 232, 233
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
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insofar as success is defined as materially altering basic default rules
in our current intellectual-property system.17
I. VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF ―ACCESS‖
―Access‖ is what the Access Movements seek, and yet the
meaning of ―access‖ may be as contested as is the proper balance for
protecting intellectual property. Access Movements are plural
because although a coherent story exists about the problem of
expanding intellectual-property protection, not all Access Movement
actors agree on the severity of, or solutions to, the problem. This is to
be expected because the Movements have multiple narrators. For
some advocates of legal reform, access simply may mean perceiving
the work. With copyright, for example, ―[e]very act of perception or
of materialization of a digital copy requires a prior act of
access. . . . Thus ‗access to the work‘ becomes a repeated operation;
each act of hearing the song or reading the document becomes an act
of ‗access.‘‖18 This is consistent with the scheme set forth in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act19 (DMCA) that distinguishes
access controls from right controls.20 Generally speaking, intellectualproperty law does not prohibit this kind of access. Copyright, patent,
and trademark law provide exclusivity of certain uses for the owner.21
17 For another recent analysis of intellectual-property rhetoric and the power of social
change, see David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652
(2010). In this article, Fagundes embraces the centrality of rhetoric in law to help transform
intellectual-property policy. Id. at 660. Fagundes does not locate the differences in the rhetoric
of Access Movements and what he calls the ―ownership discourse‖ of those seeking to
embolden property rights. Id. at 677. Instead, and as a serendipitous complement to the current
Article, Fagundes argues that embracing ownership language of traditional property rights (what
he calls ―property romance‖ of the ―high protectionists‖), but doing so in regards to claiming
public ownership over public goods, may further the agenda of the Access Movements. Id. at
692 (―Instead of responding with . . . ‗information wants to be free,‘ it would be more effective
to say ‗certainly some information is yours, but some is not, and the latter belongs to all of us as
shared property that you are free to use.‘‖). Essentially, Fagundes argues that speaking the
language of ownership is the most persuasive way to have one‘s voice heard and position
accepted. And so the Access Movements must co-opt that language for the benefit of the
commons. Id. at 694 (―By using the language of possession in a full-blooded manner and
stressing that the public‘s claim to shared cultural resources is an enforceable property interest
that merits much the same kind of respect that private entitlements do, low-protectionists can
capture some of the rhetorical thunder of property romance that is now monopolized by highprotectionists and restore balance to what is now a skewed dialogue.‖).
18 Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 115, 126.
19 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
20 See R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine
the Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 635–36 (2003)
(discussing the distinction made in the DMCA between access controls and rights controls).
21 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2006) (imposing civil liability on anyone who
reproduces, counterfeits, copies, or colorably imitates a registered mark for a commercial use
without the registrant‘s consent and on anyone who uses false designations of origin or
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Ownership does not confer control over access, when defined as a
form of perceptual experience. This is literally true with regard to
trademarks, where ownership requires use in commerce, which per se
requires public access.22 Patent law works similarly insofar as the
quid pro quo for the patent monopoly is the public disclosure of the
invention.23 The public has ―access‖ to the invention—we can know
of it and learn from it—within eighteen months of the patent filing.24
And although copyright law does not require publication for
protection (which would grant de facto public access), its ―theory of
the consumer,‖ as Professor Joe Liu has said, is of one who watches,
reads, or listens: the ―couch potato‖ whose experience of copyrighted
works is saturated access.25 When access is defined in this way,
criticism of expanding intellectual-property rights is aimed mostly at
copyright law, which restricts perception of works through the
DMCA antiaccess measures. These measures are amendments to the
Copyright Act26; some have said that they run counter to its original
structure that aims to control only certain kinds of uses.27
When ―access‖ means more than perception and includes use, the
Access Movement voices grow louder and cover more terrain. There
has been a call to immunize private, noncommercial copying from
infringement liability because, in our digital age, access to copyright
often requires making digital copies.28 Similarly, the Access
misleading descriptions in connection with goods, services, or containers for goods); 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106–107 (2006) (providing that the copyright holder has the exclusive right to make copies,
make derivative works, distribute, perform, and display, but also placing a fair-use limitation on
that exclusivity); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (providing that it is patent infringement to make, use,
offer to sell, or sell a patented invention without authority).
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2006) (requiring that trademark applicants specify a bona fide
intention to use the mark in commerce).
23 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974) (citing Universal Oil
Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944)) (discussing disclosure as the quid pro quo of the
right to exclude in patent law).
24 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006).
25 Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 402
(2003).
26 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
27 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 143 (1999) (―In theory, copyright does not reach ‗use‘; it prohibits
unauthorized reproduction, adaptation, distribution, and public performance or display . . . . Not
all ‗uses‘ correspond to these acts.‖); Reese, supra note 20, at 626–27 (explaining copyright
law‘s tolerance for certain end-user circumvention of certain access-control measures); see also
Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433, 434–
37 (2003) (critiquing recent developments in copyright law as overprotecting access in part
because of its misuse of the metaphor of the Internet as a ―space‖ or ―place‖).
28 See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347,
351–52 (2005) (discussing flaws in the application of the economic user theory to private
copiers); Liu, supra note 25, at 409–11 (describing the effects of technology on consumer
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Movements argue for broader applications of the fair-use doctrines
because increasingly the benefit of copyrighted works and trademarks
includes their derivative expressivity (as they are reused to convey
new messages).29 First principles ground these critiques of the
expansion of copyright and trademark law (e.g., fair use as a default
of nonprotection instead of an exception to protection). They tend to
argue for restricting infringement liability to those uses that strike at
the core of the ownership right, such as limiting copyright protection
to public, commercial exploitation failing any transformation of
content and limiting trademark protection to point-of-sale consumer
confusion.30 In other words, more ―access‖ seeks an expansion of
traditional categories of ―noninfringing use.‖ Similarly, the Access
Movements‘ patent-law reform calls for strengthening existing
infringement exemptions31 or carving out new ones.32 These proposals
for more access to intellectual property require ceding some control
over the property to users under specified conditions, which would

autonomy in access and consumption); R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The
Copyright Act’s Neglected Solution to the Controversy over RAM Copies,"” 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 83, 138 (2001) (describing the RAM copy doctrine, under which some courts have held
that every transmission of copyrighted material involves the making of copies by means of
temporary storage in the RAM of the computers involved in the transmission).
29 See Deborah Gerhardt & Madelyn Wessel, Fair Use and Fairness on Campus, 11 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 461 (2010) (examining the importance of a broad fair-use doctrine in the context
of education); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002)
(arguing that copyright fair use should grow with time); William McGeveran, Rethinking
Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008) (suggesting a broad simplification of the
nuanced and complex limitations used in applying the fair-use doctrine); Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, Distributive Values and Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1567 (2005) (proposing a
presumption that a defendant‘s use is fair).
30 See Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment
Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 710–711 (2009) (critiquing the doctrine of initial
interest confusion from the perspective of overexpansionist trademark law as failing to protect
trademark‘s core interests); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1698–99 (1999) (critiquing expansion of dilution doctrine
as failing to protect trademark law‘s central policy concerns); Christopher Sprigman, Copyright
and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317 (2009) (limiting copyright
liability to those uses that reduce incentives to produce more copyrighted works).
31 See Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from U.S. Patent
Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development,
56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004) (analyzing the Federal Circuit‘s diminishing reliance on the
experimental-use exemption); Matthew Rimmer, The Race to Patent the SARS Virus: The
TRIPS Agreement and Access to Essential Medicines, 5 MELB. J. INT‘L L. 335–74 (2004)
(critiquing the access-to-essential-medicines doctrine as insufficiently broad).
32 See Katherine J. Strandburg, What if There Were a Business Method User Exemption to
Patent Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245, 248 (2008) (―[S]ome business methods are
part of a larger category of user innovation . . . for the inventor‘s own use.‖); see also Julie E.
Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (2001) (arguing for an infringement exemption for reverse engineering software patents).
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leave the owner with exclusivity over more narrowly construed
enumerated rights.
In addition to access-as-perception and access-as-broadening
noninfringing uses, some Access Movement actors seek to more
radically reconfigure intellectual-property rights. The default for these
Access Movement actors is not exclusivity but sharing. These
Movement voices claim that, because our digital age constitutes our
society and ourselves in substantially different ways than before
digital media was ubiquitous, intellectual-property exclusivity must
also be substantially rethought. Distinctions between private and
public are more nuanced—and potentially illusory.33 Individuals
simultaneously feel independent from, and yet more connected to,
other people. The form and platforms for self-expression (and the
possibility of having a significant audience for that expression) are
vast and growing. The development of life-saving and life-altering
innovations, be it technological or biomedical, is hope inspiring. In
light of these changes in our twenty-first century, ―access‖ to
intellectual property—inventions, original works of expression, and
trademarks that culturally, socially, economically, and physically
sustain us—must include broad grants of use. These bequests may not
be legally required under the current regime, but they are urged as
morally indispensible.34 These Access Movement voices contend that
practical accessibility—which might include affordable or free use of
otherwise-exclusive rights in intellectual property—is now necessary
to promote progress and the useful arts for all, as much as it may also
be a matter of dignity and survival for some.
This Article focuses on the last group of access seekers, the most
radical insofar as they seek the most change in status quo. As the
Article will show, these Movement actors are not as revolutionary in
their rhetoric as their opposition perceives.35 This Article concludes
by asking whether the reform is therefore doomed or otherwise in
need of reform itself, insofar as its message and mechanism are
misaligned.
33 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 28 (1996) (arguing that contemporary ideas
about intellectual property are based on outdated notions of the distinction between private and
public space, which is counterproductive in our information-based society); see also Cohen,
supra note 28, at 367 (arguing that the public domain is not geographically discrete).
34 As will be discussed infra, Part III.A.2, such bequests include conveyances via Creative
Commons licenses, compulsory licenses for medicines, and free software.
35 See, e.g., James Grimmelman, The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2005, 2031 (2009) (critiquing the ―sharing‖ ethos of the Access Movements as ―deeply
ambiguous‖ and questioning whether it is a radical departure from the default ethical vision of
copyright law, which is mutual respect and market exchange).
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II. INTELLECTUAL-PROPERTY ORIGIN STORIES
This Part introduces the narrative structure of the ―origin story‖ as
a dominant explanation for intellectual-property protection. Further
on, the Article will compare this narrative form to the new rhetoric of
intellectual-property access in order to discern whether, in fact,
discursive shifts are occurring in our culture that may help constitute
a new socio-legal order.
Origin stories are a special kind of narrative.36 They are uniquely
persuasive as explanations for a society, an individual, or a way of
life because they collapse the inquiry of ―where did we come from?‖
with ―who are we?‖ Origin stories are therefore particularly effective
heuristics for an individual and a community because they seem to
speak to ―the essential nature of self and society.‖37 Beyond
descriptive, origin stories are also political. By explaining how a
society began and the subsequent social hierarchies that ensued as
inevitably following from those beginnings, origin stories bring order
to social relations by explaining the nature of the self and her
entitlements, her role in and relation to her society.38
Genesis is an origin story, a political origin myth, and a subgenre
of the larger category.39 It establishes the beginning of human
civilization with God‘s creation of man in His image and the
subordination of Eve through her birth (―origin‖) in Adam‘s rib.40
Other political origin stories, such as Plato‘s Myth of the Metals or
the founding of Rome by Romulus and Remus, are likewise stories of
the birth of a society and of that society‘s political contours, justifying
the relationships of power and dominance (and their eventual
evolution) with appeals to the society‘s beginnings.41

For a fuller discussion of origin myths, see Silbey, supra note 9, at 323–27.
David M. Engel, Origin Myths: Narratives of Authority, Resistance, Disability, and
Law, 27 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 785, 791 (1993).
38 See JOANNE H. WRIGHT, ORIGIN STORIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT: DISCOURSES ON
GENDER, POWER AND CITIZENSHIP 7–13 (2004) (examining the politics of origin stories).
39 See id. at 3 (describing political origin myths as stories that explain how a society or
civilization came into existence).
40 See id. at 8 (explaining the origin story of Genesis from a feminist perspective).
41 See HENRY TUDOR, POLITICAL MYTH 97, 134–35 (1972) (explaining the Roman
Foundation Myth of Romulus and Remus); WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 3–4 (explaining Plato‘s
Myth of the Metals). Plato‘s Myth of the Metals justifies the domination of laborers (made of
brass) over the intellectuals and royalty (made of gold). The founding of Rome by the sons of
the Roman god of war, Mars, glorifies Roman domination over and aggression toward
neighboring societies. Similarly, Genesis legitimates the politics of gendered hierarchies.
36
37
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A. The Political Structure of Origin Stories
1. Authenticity
Origin stories authorize current political structure in two ways:
(1) by appealing to the authenticity of beginnings; and (2) through
narratives of consent.42 As to the first, we say that which existed in
the beginning is essential to our nature, or that the original person or
element was first for a reason and should be honored. This paean to
being first, a literal origin, materializes in intellectual-property
doctrine in terms of being the ―first and true inventor‖ in patent law,43
or the originator of the creative expression in copyright law,44 or the
first effective source designator in trademark law.45
The more subtle connection made between being first and being
authentic is no less pervasive in intellectual-property doctrine. In
patent law, authenticity is measured through ―conception,‖ the rule of
ownership that assigns intellectual property based on the assertion of
direct lineage of the invention from the mind of the inventor.46 In
copyright law, authenticity is assured through, among other doctrines,
the fact/expression dichotomy and the low threshold for creativity.47
A copyrightable work need not be highly creative or novel, only more
than ―merely trivial.‖48 But, it must nonetheless originate from the
individual and be ―‗recognizably his own.‘‖49 Thus, copyright law
protects only expression as created and not facts that are merely
42 See Silbey, supra note 9, at 323–27 (arguing for intellectual-property protection through
a narrative structure of the origin myth).
43 This language comes from the first U.S. patent statute requiring that the subject of the
invention was ―not before known or used‖ and the applicant be the ―first and true inventor.‖ Act
to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts (Patent Act of 1790), ch. 7, §§ 1, 5, 1 Stat. 109, 109–11.
44 An author is ―he to whom anything owes its origin ; originator ; maker.‖ Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (internal quotations omitted).
45 See Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 814 (1927) (explaining that the trademark ―was a true mark of origin, designating as it did
the actual producer of the goods‖); see also Silbey, supra note 9, at 362 (in the context of
geographically colliding marks that are similar, discussing how trademark law determines
property interests based on the relative success of each mark in communicating identity and
authenticity to the consumer first).
46 An inventor is one who ―conceived the invention,‖ who first formed in his mind ―a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention.‖ Townsend v. Smith, 36
F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929).
47 See Silbey, supra note 9, at 343–45, 350 (arguing that authenticity derives from
individuality and control inherent in authorship).
48 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951)).
49 Id. (quoting Alfred Bell & Co. 191 F.2d at 103). The Supreme Court has explained
individual authenticity: ―Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has something irreducible,
which is one man‘s alone.‖ Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)
(Holmes, J.).
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discovered.50 The low creativity threshold assures that nearly
anything that springs from the mind will be protected; it appears that
the origination from the subjective mind (and almost nothing more)
endows the work with value. Trademark law protects authenticity by
assuring the integrity of the good, its unadulterated quality.
Trademarks guarantee reputational purity through verification of the
good‘s source. Although trademarks come in all valences, trademarks
are only valued inasmuch as they distinguish the good of one from the
good of another, as if to say ―this is the real thing.‖ Authenticity and
difference are the dominant currencies in our branding system
sustained by trademark law. The existence of an origin (and its
superlative value) structures that currency relation.51
2. Heroic Actors
Being first in this way—being authentic—explains the privileges
of ownership, including the privilege of denying access and control
by others. This privilege is justified not only by lineage but also by
status. The owners of intellectual property are described as a certain
kind of person. Patent inventors possess ―genius‖;52 they are not
―mere artisans‖ or ―mechanics.‖53 Likewise, authors demonstrate a
―creative spark‖ using their ―fancy or imagination.‖54 And trademark
law assumes a ―sovereign consumer[,] . . . a utility-maximizing agent
of unbounded rational choice.‖55 And although the consumer is not
50 See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) (holding
that the names and telephone numbers used in the plaintiff‘s telephone directory were not
sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection).
51 See
Silbey, supra note 9, at 362 (―Th[e] origin story of trademark‘s
protection . . . assumes . . . a culture that is premised on the value of authenticity and difference.
Trademarks stand for the integrity of the good, its authenticity, or its unadulterated quality as if
to say, ‗this is the real thing‘ or ‗straight from the source.‘ Trademarks are also only valued
inasmuch as they distinguish the good of one from the good of another.‖ (footnote omitted)).
52 See, e.g., Cuno Eng‘g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941)
(stating that a new device ―must reveal the flash of creative genius‖ in order to be patentable);
Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 357 (1875) (requiring ―inventive genius‖); see also Silbey,
supra note 9, at 334 (discussing the terms used in Cuno Engineering and Reckendorfer).
53 See, e.g., Standard Elec. Works v. Manhattan Elec. Supply Co., 212 F. 944, 945 (2d Cir.
1914) (―[W]hen [a] need has existed unfulfilled for some time before the inventor filled it[,]
that . . . gives strength to the conclusion that to make it took more than mere artisan‘s
skill . . . .‖); see also Silbey, supra note 9, at 334 (discussing the terms used in Standard Electric
Works).
54 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345 (explaining that to be copyrightable, a work
must be original, that is, it must ―possess some creative spark‖); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (distinguishing the creation of a trademark—through the adoption of an
existing symbol—from the creation of a copyrightable work, which requires ―fancy or
imagination‖); see also Silbey, supra note 9, at 342 (discussing the terms used in Feist
Publications and In re Trade-Mark Cases).
55 Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020,
2023 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the owner of the trademark, it is for her benefit that trademark law
exists so that she can shop more efficiently and with more meaningful
choice.56 These personages of intellectual-property law are heroic
actors. The description of their character attests to the importance of
independence and resourcefulness as personal qualities.57 The stories
(or laws) justifying their status resemble those describing the
glorified, rugged individuals of American history and political
thought, many of whom were inventors or authors themselves.58 In
this way, intellectual-property law reflects and instantiates the
privilege and reward that adorns the archetypical American hero.
Where is the origin story in this description of the high-status
intellectual-property owners? The narrative logic of origin stories
relies on a belief in core elements of human nature that existed in the
beginning and remain consistent over time, thus justifying unequal
treatment of people or groups based on these essential, nonchanging
differences.59 Plato‘s Myth of the Metals describes ―natural‖
differences among people—those who use reason (made of gold) and
those who use brawn (made of brass)—to legitimize dominance of the
ruling class over the laborers.60 Likewise, Genesis describes ―natural‖
differences between the sexes (one weak, the other strong) to justify
hierarchical gender relations that explain the fall from the Garden of
Eden and all relations thereafter.61 Those who existed as powerful ―in
the beginning‖ legitimately exercise power into the future because of
some inherent and unchanging quality that explains why they were
first initially. This rationale is not intellectual property‘s alone—we
see this in other legal canons, such as in U.S. constitutional law and
its invocation of ―original intent‖ of the Founding Fathers to justify a
particular interpretation of the Constitution.62 One might think that
56 See Silbey, supra note 9, at 361 (―The benefits of trademark protection . . . inure to the
consumer, who can shop more efficiently and presumably with more choice . . . .‖); see also
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Rational Limits of Trademark Law (2000) (―Trademark protection
against confusing simulation thus advances the interests of producers and consumers by
protecting the integrity of consumer understanding and the producer‘s investment in creating
goodwill.‖), in U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 59, 63 (Hugh Hansen ed.,
2006); cf. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1839 (2007) (demonstrating that trademark law was not traditionally intended to protect
consumers).
57 See generally Silbey, supra note 9 (discussing the origin story as it relates to
individuality and authenticity in patent, copyright, and trademark law).
58 See, e.g., Silbey supra note 9, at 325 (describing U.S. national heroes intimately tied to
the nation‘s own origin story: Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and Abraham Lincoln); id.
at 321, 336 (discussing rugged individualism and the American dream).
59 WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 73–75 (discussing the notion of human nature developed
through Genesis and Hobbes‘s theory of human nature).
60 See id. at 4–7 (exploring Plato‘s myth of the metals).
61 See id. at 8 (discussing the story of Genesis).
62 ―[I]nvocation of a political origin, such as the Founding Fathers of the United States

12/30/2010 8:34:29 PM

2010]

COMPARATIVE TALES

211

intellectual property‘s goal of ―progress of the useful arts‖ would
eschew a backward-looking explanation for its assertion of privilege.
But intellectual-property law does not justify its distribution of rights
based on what people said and thought two hundred years ago;
instead, it celebrates characteristics of those great inventors, authors
and merchants of our past that remain celebrated today,
characteristics such as self-reliance, imaginativeness, and
individuality.
3. Consent
What if we were to protest this arrangement and ask: ―What of
those who do not have the resources to fully realize their creative
potential because of the rising cost of access fees?‖ To this, the origin
stories propose that we have consented to the political structure and
our system of rights and privileges.63 Origin stories sanction
beginnings and legitimate the ensuing status quo by describing both
as products of mutual consent. Mutual consent comes in all forms in
origin stories—written and explicit political contracts (constitutions,
statutes), oral or civil contracts (the marriage contract), tacit consent
or acquiescence.64 Sometimes consent is manufactured through
repetition of the story in society at large (or in law specifically).65
Sometimes consent is made clear from the behavior of the parties ―in
the beginning‖ through open deliberations or explicit voting,
whatever change of heart or circumstance may affect the nature of the
bargain into the future.66
Consent and free will are central features of the intellectualproperty origin stories as they smooth over troubling and potentially
unjust arrangements. The who and how of inventor and invention in
patent law is justified by creation stories, declarations made under
oath that initiate the patent application and that form the basis of an
originary contract binding the inventor and the U.S. government to

and their intent in drafting the Constitution, can justify present circumstances and assertions of
right with an appeal to the past.‖ Silbey, supra note 9, at 325–26.
63 Statutes may be criticized as wrongheaded, but if they regulate economic matters and
are products of open deliberation in a democratic forum, then they tend to survive deferential
judicial scrutiny. Here, consent is conjured from the democratic process.
64 See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 86–89 (analyzing Hobbes‘s rhetorical strategy of
supporting his notion of tacit consent to political rule with what he characterizes as tacit consent
to patriarchal rule).
65 ―Retelling the mythic narrative assures consent to the arrangement, either explicitly as a
form of contract or implicitly through acquiescence.‖ Silbey, supra note 9, at 327.
66 Id. at 326–27.
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the terms therein.67 In part because of the ethereality of conception in
patent law, we accept the assertion of inventorship status on faith
when the mutual consent of the collaborators is perceived on the
facts.68 The whole panoply of collaborators—from the lab technicians
to lead scientists—are presumed to agree (consent) to the terms to
which they have sworn under oath declaring the correctness of
inventorship, which determines ownership.69 If individuals or
institutions involved in the patent filing later find themselves at a
disadvantage because of the scope of, or the named inventors on, the
patent, they only have themselves to blame, as the patent is a direct
result of the agreed-to relations between the parties. Like any
contract, parties who consented to the property arrangement contained
therein should be wary to protest later when implied or explicit terms
are enforced against them. How are disagreements like these averted
or resolved? A persuasive origin story resolves them; one that
manufactures consent to, and a belief in, the terms (inventorship) of
the original patent contract.70
Consent arises in copyright law with works for hire and jointly
authored works. As for jointly authored works, the standard for
mutual consent requires the intent of both parties, demands certainty,
and disregards the amount or quality of the putative coauthor‘s
creative contribution to the original work.71 As an esteemed value in a
67

Id. at 330.
―Given the ethereality of conception, substantiating it requires a persuasive creation
story describing in words, more often than proving through tangible evidence, how the inventor
originated the invention . . . first.‖ Id. at 327; see also Bd. of Educ. ex rel Bd. of Trs. of Fla.
State Univ. v. Am. Bioscience Inc., 333 F.3d 1330, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (―[I]t is the
responsibility of the applicants and their attorneys to ensure that the inventors named in a patent
application are the only true inventors.‖); 37 C.F.R. § 1.63(a) (2009) (―An oath or declaration
filed under § 1.51(b)(2) as part of a nonprovisional application must . . . [s]tate that the person
making the oath or declaration believes the named inventor or inventors to be the original and
first inventor or inventors of the subject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is
sought.‖). Patent examiners in the United States normally do not review the correctness of
inventor naming, but rely on the solemn inventor declaration or oath that is a required part of a
patent application. Am. Bioscience Inc., 333 F.3d at 1344.
69 See Silbey, supra note 9, at 329–30 (discussing the PTO‘s reliance on sworn
declarations to determine inventorship).
70 On the seduction of storytelling, see ROSS CHAMBERS, STORY AND SITUATION:
NARRATIVE SEDUCTION AND THE POWER OF FICTION (1984). ―[T]he further claim is now made
that such [narrative] seduction, producing authority where there is no power, is a means of
converting (historical) weakness into (discursive) strength.‖ Id. at 212. Certainly, most
successful litigation requires persuasive and seductive story tellers. My assertion here is that the
touchstone of patent protection (conception) depends on a good origin story above most else,
especially when inventorship and nonobviousness are at issue. For storytelling and property
relations, see generally CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE
HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994).
71 See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no objective
manifestations of a shared intent to be coauthors, despite the plaintiff‘s ―very valuable
contributions‖). See generally Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and
68
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democracy, consent would seem to work to the benefit of the
governed. But in copyright law, the standard ―creates a great deal of
mischief, for it allows one collaborator—the dominant party—to lure
others into contributing material to a unitary work, all the while
withholding the intent to share in its economic and reputational
benefits.‖72 In this context, true consent is an ideal often left
unrealized. With the work-for-hire doctrine, the default rule that
employees do not own the creative fruits of their labor wreaks a
similar injustice. The doctrine assumes implied consent to transfer
authorship from the employee to the employer when a work is
produced within the scope of employment.73 Consent is fictional. It
assumes facts that are not likely true (that employees or potential
employees have any meaningful control over the scope of their
employment, or that frank discussions of authorship occur regularly
and honestly in the workplace).74 More often, the work-for-hire and
joint-authorship doctrines confer the privilege of copyright only on an
author who has the capacity to originate creative work (through
property ownership or influence). In these copyright contexts, the
origin myth of copyright expressly embodies the story of rugged
American individualism, glorifying the person with the wherewithal
to rise to the top of the economic or social ladder and conferring upon
him legal protection as owner.75
Consent also arises in trademark law, under the rubric of free will
and choice. The trademark consumer is made to believe that, through
her choices of branded products, she has some control over the nature
of the goods she consumes, and thus over the identity she creates for

Collective Creativity, 10 C ARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 314–16 (1992) (criticizing the
doctrine of joint authorship and its reliance on an individualistic notion of authorship); Gregory
Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual
Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (giving a more recent critique of the
joint-authorship doctrine).
72 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship,
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1206 (2000).
73 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–102, 201(b) (2006) (providing that a work made for hire can also
be created explicitly through contract if such a work falls into specific categories designated by
the statute).
74 See Dreyfuss, supra note 72, at 1203 (describing how the work-for-hire doctrine works
poorly in a research-university setting); see also CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC
WORK? BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 89–90 (2001) (reporting how
discussions of authorship on collaborations are described by subjects as ―embarrassing‖ and
―uneasy‖ and thus often avoided altogether or resolved without attention to original contribution
but human relation).
75 The laborers at the bottom of the rung (as opposed to originators at the top) are felled
by the ―sweat of the brow‖ doctrine in copyright. See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349 (―The primary objective is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‗[t]o
promote the Progress of the Science and useful Arts.‘‖ (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
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herself through consumption. Branding is as much about market share
and consumer identification as it is about personal-identity politics in
today‘s society. We buy goods for what they are and for what they
say about each of us.76 Part of the trademark origin myth is that each
of us is (or can be) unique and different in ways that we can foster
and control through our purchasing power. In a democratic society
that celebrates difference and free choice, this vision is fundamental
to national success.
The trademark origin story values autonomy and sovereignty as if
both are uncontroversial and straightforward in our complex web of
commercial relations. It is based on a theory of rational choice that
depends on a meaningful distinction between freedom and coercion in
advertising.77 Although the consumer is not the originator of the
mark, she is the originator of its meaning. Without the consumer‘s
clearheadedness, and because of the consumer‘s confusion, the mark
will be strong or weak, valid or infringed. It is her consent to engage
in branding culture that keeps trademarks alive.
B. The Myth, a Disconnect
Is any of this really a problem? ―So what?‖ we might say in
response to this description of origin stories justifying intellectualproperty arrangements. A problem exists if the description herein of
the inventor, author, or consumer is false, or if it has become less true
in light of the changed contexts of innovation, creativity, and
consumerism in our twenty-first century. As this subsection will
discuss, a disconnect exists between the intellectual-property origin
stories and contemporary ways of generating intellectual property
(such as through user innovation, derivative works, and expressive
consumerism).78 Where traditional intellectual-property law depends
Silbey, supra note 9, at 364, 366.
See, e.g., Richard Elliott, Existential Consumption and Irrational Desire, 31 EUR. J.
MARKETING 285, 289–92 (1997) (describing the dichotomy between creativity and constraint);
see also JUDITH WILLIAMSON, CONSUMING PASSIONS: THE DYNAMICS OF POPULAR CULTURE
(1986) (arguing that advertising unconsciously effects consumers‘ desire in their exercise of
purchasing choices).
78 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 28 (discussing the increasing importance of users of
copyrighted works and juxtaposing it with the absence of the user from copyright doctrine); see
also Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960 (1993) (noting that
trademarks have moved beyond their original function as brand identifiers and have become
commodities themselves and discussing whether the law should protect trademarks when they
are used as separate products); Liu, supra note 25 (recognizing that copyright law lacks a welldeveloped theory of the consumer and exploring the consumer‘s interests in autonomy,
communication, and creative self-expression); Fred Gault & Eric von Hippel, The Prevalence of
User Innovation and Free Innovation Transfers: Implications for Statistical Indicators and
Innovative Policy (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 4722-09, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337232 (suggesting that the
76
77
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on the creator or user as independent and free—autonomous, to use
the lingo of individual liberty—both are unattainable ideals and, in
some circumstances, undesirable in light of the competing social
value of equality.
Who is this inventor at the heart of patent law who reaps the
benefits of his genius? He is isolated and unspoiled, an expert who
might be part of a community of scientists or technologists, but who
invents freshly, thinking ―out of the box.‖ He is an entrepreneur of
sorts. As many before have noted, the ―heroic inventor‖ of patent law
is not the norm in the twenty-first century, but the statutory and case
law have only recently acknowledged as much.79 The inventor is not
described in law or culture as a member of a collaborative
community, his work and ideas inextricably bound up with that of his
colleagues. The theory of scientist as cyborg—asserting a blurred
boundary between making discoveries and being remade by them—is
far from our legal imagination.80 Where everyday experience might
enlighten us as to the effect of institutions on people and vice versa,
the reigning ideology in patent law remains mostly blind to the
material effects of culture and context on innovation. In conventional
patent doctrine, inventors and their inventions are born, not made.81
The problem of essentializing looms large here. The messy
corporeality and contingencies of people‘s lives and work drive the
desire for predictability. Legal clarity reinforces a myth of creative
genius arising from ―heroic isolation‖ rather than through ―an
extended system of production.‖82 Autonomy and separateness are
prerequisites for being an inventor, and neither reflects the reality of
how we live today.83 The connectivity that is hailed as a benefit of our
government‘s policy of subsidizing the process of obtaining intellectual-property rights as a way
of encouraging innovation should be reexamined in light of the fact that many user-innovators
already transfer their innovations to others at no charge).
79 See Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property Law, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 183, 190–91 (2006) (―Th[e] focus on the mental part of inventive
activity . . . has its roots in nineteenth century notions of the solitary creative
genius. . . . Multiple contributions to the invention resulting in multiple claimants to ownership,
as is the common practice in modern corporate research settings, has created ongoing problems
within patent law and has only been very slowly accommodated within the statute.‖).
80 See generally DONNA J. HARAWAY, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and
Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century (in support of feminist politics and moving
beyond traditional dualisms, suggesting that there is little difference between who we are and
what we make), in SIMIANS, CYBORGS AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE 149–81
(1991).
81 For a recent popular critique of this view, see M ALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE
STORY OF SUCCESS (2008).
82 Burk, supra note 79, at 193.
83 If it ever did reflect our reality. See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED
SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript ch.
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Internet Age may disadvantage those in the patent race who are most
fully networked, who deemphasize origin, and instead glorify
community.84 Would we say that the developers of Apache or Linux
or of the mountain bike are not worthy of the lofty title of inventor?85
Is the personage of the author similarly misaligned with twentyfirst-century norms of creativity? Who is the author at the heart of
traditional copyright law? Copyright ownership does not run to
laborers86 or collaborators who lack permission or perfect consent.
Copyright law instantiates the myth of the autonomous, unique
individual and ignores the ―dialogic‖ nature of copyright.87 When law
protects only the authentic or original works of authorship and not the
products of collage, collaboration, or derivations, it reflects a
hierarchy of values: uniqueness and private ownership over
commonalities and sharing. ―We embrace this story of human
originality because we want to believe we are each unique and thus
each capable of creating copyright-protected expression.‖88 But if
these dynamics hold fast, those who control employment relations, or
who hold property in their institutional position, are the beneficiaries

5 at 93–97) (on file with author) (tracing the development and demise of the autonomous
individual in contemporary philosophy and political theory); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility,
Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 188 (2008) (suggesting that liberal legal
theory‘s attachment to individual autonomy is one explanation for intellectual property‘s
uncomfortable fit with privacy law); see also Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 22 (1988) (describing this phenomenon in the context of feminist legal theory);
cf. Mandel, supra note 71 (arguing that despite new research showing how to effectively
promote creativity, intellectual-property law clings to outdated stereotypes about creativity,
particularly in the realm of joint-inventor law).
84 See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1331 (2004) (outlining the argument that existing circumstances, such as wealth,
power, and access, will continue to give some individuals an advantage, even if property rights
in intellectual property are vested in ―the commons‖).
85 See Virginia Postrel, Innovation Moves from the Laboratory to the Bike Trail and the
Kitchen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, at C2 (citing examples as diverse as open-source software
and mountain biking to illustrate the phenomenon of users developing and sharing their own
innovations).
86 See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (―The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‗[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.‘‖ (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8)); see
also id. at 353 (describing the flaws of the ―sweat of the brow‖ doctrine).
87 See Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for
Copyright Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 207, 233 (2007) (―The societal function
of copyright is to encourage participation in cultural dialogue. Where the author is a worthy
producer of something from nothing and the work is an owned object of fixed meaning, the
dialogic and communicative nature of cultural creativity is hidden from view. The result is a
copyright regime which propertizes and over-protects the works of some authors while
dismissing others as copiers and trespassers; which encourages some kinds of creativity while
condemning others as unlawful appropriation; which values so-called original contributions but
silences responses in the cultural conversation.‖).
88 Silbey, supra note 9, at 348.
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of this system and truly isolated individuals will suffer.89 This makes
less sense in a world where new, writerly innovations of the digital
age, such as hypertext, collaborative novels, and online journaling,
dominate creative consumption. Today, more than ever, ―users‖ and
―authors‖ meld. Privileging the fiction of ―author,‖ as originator, and
forcing payment from ―readers,‖ as users/consumers, may tip the
balance in the copyright system from incentivizing creation to
frustrating it.90
The subject of trademark law suffers a similar fate when brought
into the twenty-first-century context. We have already called the
trademark consumer ―sovereign‖—autonomy in regal clothing.
Indeed, trademark law relies on the truth of the trademark‘s modus
operandi: that there exist essential differences between uniquely
branded goods that form a reasonable basis from which our freely
made purchasing choices flow. But these assumptions are wrong if
even some of the literature on, and the purpose behind, advertising is
right.91 The literature exposes how trademarks reify the ideal of free
choice for consumers and hide the fact of their manufactured desire.
We, consumers, are influenced by brands as much as we might hope
to influence branding strategy. There may be less difference between
brands or goods than the difference in the signal each sends.92 Do we
think there is a material difference between Nike® and Reebok®, or do
89 See generally MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT
(1993) (discussing the development of the originality standard that is perceived to benefit
authors but was motivated in part by the publishers who would own the works).
90 See Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL‘Y & L. 519, 535–37, 544 (2006) (―Feminist commentators‘ observations suggest that the
‗writerly‘ characteristics of hypertext constitute a medium that may be conducive to learning,
writing, and thinking outside the established linear and hierarchical structures of traditional
media. However, feminist thinking also predicts that the dominant culture will resist such
subversion of authority. Unsurprisingly, there is already evidence that this is the case. In
particular, the current legal milieu may not be conducive to the development of such feminist or
other non-traditional readings of digital texts. Rather, the exclusive rights conferred by
copyright, specifically the right of adaptation, lend themselves to authorial control over not only
the text, but also to a reader‘s use of the text.‖); see also Sonia K. Katyal, Performance,
Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L.
461, 475 (2006) (demonstrating how, in the context of fan fiction, copyright law can inhibit and
does prohibit certain valuable expression); Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and
Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 273, 304 (2007) (describing the
gendered nature of the fair-use calculation: it systematically undervalues nonmarket production
at the expense of women‘s creativity).
91 Beebe, supra note 55, at 2023 (explaining the debating sides of the trademark consumer
as the sovereign and the fool); see also Elliott, supra note 77 (surveying advertising literature
that explains how consumers succumb to persuasion of advertising and how consumers exercise
some agency in their purchasing choices).
92 We can assert a difference between a generic and the designer equivalent, but the
difference that is likely to matter to most people is what we think it means to buy generic over
the designer brand (the social significance), not that the designer good is of higher quality or
better looking.
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we only prefer the message of one over the other? Because
trademarks serve expressive functions, we construct identities through
our purchasing choices. As the saying goes, we are what we buy.93
The irony is that as we construct our identities, claiming we are each
unique, we do so in the mass market where desire follows the herd.
Contrary to the theory of the liberal legal subject, individual and free,
we are not autonomous market actors, independent of outside
influence. Our choices and motives are inextricably intertwined with
the ex ante development and marketing of goods and services that
shape our identities.94 The origin story of trademarks makes us think
we are coequal actors with the producers and manufacturers in a
marketplace of choice. It perpetuates the notion of the consumer as
both freely engaged in, and gratefully protected by, transparent
commercial relations, choosing products of our own freewill rather
than being chosen by them.95 Uncovering the origin myth of
trademarks (the sovereign consumer) reveals its submerged twin (the
duped consumer protected by law from confusing and manipulative
advertising).96 It also demonstrates how the persuasive narrative of
the sovereign consumer can hide (or justify) the inequality and
violence caused by twenty-first-century capitalism in the form of
intensified social and class hierarchies, environmental dangers, and
undifferentiated mass culture.97
93 See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & TIM MAY, THINKING SOCIOLOGICALLY 156 (2d ed. 2001)
(describing ―neo-tribes‖ as social affiliations based on the construction of identity through
consumption).
94 Product manufacturers and service providers are not necessarily guided solely by the
question ―What do consumers want?‖ Instead, product manufacturers and service providers also
ask ―How can we make the consumer want what we sell?‖
95 Douglas Kysar has argued that producers, manufacturers and legislators may
underestimate the important intersection between consumer preferences for certain products and
the ways in which consumer-citizens shape civil society through their purchasing choices.

[T]he already heroic conceptual role of the consumer within market liberalism seems
poised to become even more heroic. Long expected to help raise collective welfare
through constant material accumulation, consumers also now are being charged with
determining the outcome of important policy disputes by revealing—again through
private market behavior—their true level of support for human safety, the
environment, and a host of other public goods. Although proponents of this valuation
methodology expect market choices to reveal purely private preferences, individuals
acting on process preferences instead seem to regard consumption at least partially as
an act of public significance.
Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Process: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 533 (2004).
96 Beebe, supra note 55, at 2023.
97 See, e.g., Nicholas Bayard, Valuing Nature in Environmental Education, GREEN TCHR.,
Summer 2006, at 27, 28, available at 2006 WLNR 15517646 (―The goal of the activity is to
demonstrate the catastrophes (both environmental and economic) that can arise when
individuals pursue their own economic self-interest without regard for natural cycles and limits
and without controls to mitigate their impact on the environment. Ironically, this is the very
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In response to a perceived expansion of intellectual-property rights
over the second half of the twentieth century, today new voices
challenge the assumptions and the balance struck by intellectualproperty legislation and case law. Consciously or not, the origin myth
is being busted. The advocates of access are not speaking against
property; rather, they are speaking against origins. A close look at
their rhetoric and recent case law reveals, ironically enough, a
potential new beginning, a new future for intellectual-property
relations, based not on origins, but on something else. Part III of this
Article evaluates the chorus of these voices that make up the Access
Movements and the stories they tell. It asks, in particular, whether
they perpetuate the origin stories of intellectual property or whether
they instead expose the myth of origins. As they embark on a new
politics of intellectual property, in what way do the Access
Movements reconfigure the reasons for and the values of legal
protection for intellectual property in our digital future? Can they
(must they?) shed the old protagonists—the heroic inventor, the
romantic author, and the sovereign consumer? Can they evolve the
values of autonomy and consent from their idealistic incarnations to
something more contextual, more real, in order to undo the
hierarchies of propertied relations of the origins stories of intellectual
property?
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
RHETORIC OF SOCIAL CHANGE
This Part highlights a new way of talking about intellectual
property. In contrast to the origin stories of Part II, the Access
Movements appear to tell a different story. The Access Movements
are not against intellectual property. But they are, generally speaking,
antiexpansionist. And some of the voices in the Movements are also
antioriginists.
The Access Movements do not focus on protecting beginnings—
be it conception, fixed original expression, or the virtues of
branding—but instead on nurturing the creative community from
within which socially beneficial intangibles are made. These Access
Movement voices interrogate the theory that more intellectualproperty commodification creates positive monetary and cultural
value, by arguing that strong exclusive rights limit access to (and
thereby stifle) innovation and creativity. The Access Movements also

system on which capitalism is predicated: free markets and competition in the pursuit of
individual self-interest.‖).
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question the governing incentive model that anchors U.S. intellectualproperty law.98 By questioning these central premises of intellectualproperty protection and exposing others as wrongheaded, the Access
Movements seek to transform attitudes, behavior, and law. In so
doing, the Access Movements discard the hierarchical rhetoric and
consequences of the dominant intellectual-property regimes and
embrace (intentionally or not) a new model of politico-legal practice.
The story that the Access Movements tell purports to be a new future
for intellectual property. But, as will become clear, it is built on some
of the same old foundations. This may, however, be good for legal
reform. In fact, it is possible that sustainable change can only occur if
the old ways are folded into the new ones. A closer look at these new
stories, and how they compare to similar rhetorical shifts from recent
history, may help predict intellectual property‘s future.
This Part proceeds in two sections. Section A highlights the
antiorigins language of the countermobilization and argues that this
rhetoric, based on a fundamentally different understanding of how
and why people work and innovate, displaces the myth of beginnings
and replaces it with the power of peopled networks. Section B shows
how the antiorigin language of Section A discards the hierarchical
language of customary intellectual-property law and instead
recognizes an antisubordination principle that, when applied to
intellectual-property law, requires a reexamination of the property
relations that stem from the conventional legal analysis of
intellectual-property entitlements. Part IV, then, explains how, despite
advocating for a future for intellectual property that embraces
antiorigin and antisubordination principles, the Access Movements
remain committed to idealized core values of liberal legal politics.
Whether this continued commitment frustrates the possibility of legal
reform that secures practical access to intellectual property will be the
final question this Article raises.
A. The Antiorigins of the Countermobilization
1. The Private/Public Breakdown
The countermobilization against the expansion of intellectual
property emphasizes the importance of a commons, a space neither
wholly public nor wholly private. This commons reimagines the role
of the marketplace by merging private interests with public values.
98 See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Abolition and Attribution, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 1063,
1063–64 (2009) (exploring the effect of abolition of copyright on author‘s incentives in light of
other non-legal forms of renumeration).
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Driven by a perception of a ―common interest which cuts across
traditional oppositions,‖99 the Access Movements discard the
traditional public/private dichotomy.100 Whether speaking about the
public domain or a commons,101 public space and private lives are
inextricably entwined.102 As such, we must rethink how and why we
protect privacy and how and why we preserve the commons (and
whether the answers to these questions are meaningfully distinct).103
Although there is a healthy debate about the shape of the public
domain and/or the commons,104 the debate is ongoing because of a
concern that neither as presently constituted through our intellectualproperty regime is sufficient to support the development of diverse
and sustainable cultures, as well as to preserve human rights.
Breaking down barriers between public and private spaces and
reconstituting a robust, accessible commons is important to the
Access Movements. This is because practical access to cultural goods
is necessary for selfhood as much as it is important for the social,
political, and economic progress of the community.105 This is not to
assert the primacy of self in our political organization. To the
contrary, it recognizes the ―mutually constitutive relationships
between and among the self, community, and culture.‖106 With the

99 James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47
DUKE L.J. 87, 108 (1997).
100 See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 33, at 28–30 (describing how the private and public divide
is an ever shifting landscape in our information age).
101 The public domain is free for everyone without strings attached. Most commons are not
based on underlying property rights, but on broad grants of use privileges and mutual
commitments to follow the rules of use. See James Boyle, Cultural Environmentalism and
Beyond, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 5, 8–9 (making just this distinction).
102 See BOYLE, supra note 33, at 32 (describing various contradictions relation to the false
dichotomy of private/public).
103 See BOYLE, supra note 33, at 32–33 (discussing what is considered private and how we
protect privacy); Cohen, supra note 28, at 367 (discussing what is considered the public
domain); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008) (defining privacy and
criticizing and suggesting different theories of privacy)). See generally Jerry Kang & Benedikt
Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 229 (2004) (discussing law and policy
issues concerning privacy).
104 The Winter/Spring 2003 issue of Law & Contemporary Problems, for example, is
devoted to the public domain and the information age.
105 See Cohen, supra note 28, at 370 (describing need for practical access to expressive
works for self-development and creative play).
106 Id. at 372. The theory that identity is constituted by context has a pedigree much older
than the Access Movements. See Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self, (exploring the
ancient origins of ―technologies of the self‖), in TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF: A SEMINAR WITH
MICHEL FOUCAULT 16, 19–22 (Luther H. Martin et al. eds., 1988); see also Susan Scafidi,
F.I.T.: Fashion as Information Technology, 59 SYR. L. REV. 69, 74 (2008) (―As [Marshall]
McLuhan observes, technology programs how people relate to their environment—it is, in short,
a techne, or craft, in the fullest sense of the word, shaping not just the material out of which it is
fashioned, but the users themselves.‖).
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breakdown of discrete notions of the public and the private comes the
breakdown of discrete notions of the individual and the community.
In In re Application of Cellco Partnership,107 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that Verizon
customers who use copyrighted musical compositions as ringtones on
their cellular phones do not violate the composer‘s exclusive right to
public performance.108 Thus, Verizon is not contributorily liable for
copyright infringement.109 The court explained that the Copyright Act
exempts from section 106(4) infringement ―those performances of a
musical work that occur within the ‗normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances‘ and . . . ‗[any] performance of a . . . musical
work . . . without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial
advantage.‘‖110 It then goes on to conclude that ―[t]he playing of
ringtones fits comfortably within these statutory exemptions.‖111
No doubt, cellular customers have no intent to profit from the
ringtones. But the court‘s conclusion that cellular phones are heard
more often in circumscribed private setting than on the street, on
public transportation or in restaurants is puzzling. Indeed, when
pushed on the issue, the court invokes a gestalt of deliberative
democracy and reasonableness. ―‗[O]ne may search the Copyright
Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of the millions
of people‘ who own cellular telephones ‗have made it unlawful‘ to
allow that telephone to ring in a public setting.‖112 Here, the
commercial download of a copyrighted musical composition that is
made to be heard in public is exempted from copyright liability. The
public space of the public phone call becomes a private space; and the
private choice of ring tone is free to be disseminated in public. It is
not surprising given the ubiquity of cellular phones and the complex
boundary problems they create—When are public phone
conversations inappropriately private? Which public spaces are cellphone friendly and which are not?—that this court collapses the
distinction between the public and private sphere to enable more
conversations (and more public ringing!). Although it is possible to
read this case as suggesting that public phone conversations should be
respected as private, it is equally plausible to understand this case as
saying that this kind of public activity—a new and widely embraced
107 663

F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
at 374–75.
109 Id. at 374–76.
110 Id. at 374–75 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
110(4) (2006)).
111 Id. at 375.
112 Id. (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)).
108 Id.
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form of engagement in our digital world—must be off-limits to
copyright liability for the connectivity and expressivity cellular
phones provides to continue.
2. A Community “Sharing Nicely”
These blurred boundaries of an evolving intellectual-property
discourse suggest a form of communal ownership.113 Whether this
devolution of property takes the form of a ―noncommercial‖ term in a
Creative Commons license or the conveyance of property to a
communal trust, the argument from the Access Movements is that we
should abandon ―whether or not to commodify . . . [and instead]
focus[] on . . . creat[ing] differentiated interpersonal ties that are just,
equal, socially beneficial, and satisfying to participants.‖114 As James
Boyle wrote:
Because there is, in fact, no intelligible geography of public
and private, I suggest that our decisions should focus on a
different set of criteria. The first is egalitarian—having to do
with the relative powerlessness of the group seeking
information access or protection. The second is the familiar
radical republican goal of creating and reinforcing a vigorous
public sphere of democracy and debate.115
The seed of growth for this new society lies not in any singular
individual or baseline market principle, but, as the language of the
commons emphasizes, in the commitment to a specific kind of
community. The focus on a commons changes the conversation from
individual ownership to shared values.116 Rather than drawing a
distinction between author and audience, for example, the Access
Movements assert that without a community organized around a
commons, there is no value (personal or otherwise) to build or protect
through property rights.117 And although we might say that the Access
113 See Carpenter et al., supra note 10, at 1022 (advocating a trust version of property and
tracing its long history as a form of property relations). See generally Madhavi Sunder, Property
in Personhood, (discussing how intellectual-property law applies to cultural commodities that
would ordinarily be considered common property), in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES
AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 164 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
114 Victoria F. Phillips, Commodification, Intellectual Property and the Quilters of Gee’s
Bend, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 359, 374 (2007).
115 BOYLE, supra note 33, at 28.
116 Boyle goes on to say, ―These two criteria are not neutral or descriptive—they represent
a value choice.‖ Id.
117 See Boyle, supra note 101, at 9–10 (discussing the increased amount of literature on the
commons); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1544–
47 (1989) (rethinking the public interest for which the concept of community is central to
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Movements conceive of the community as the origin of creativity and
innovation, the notion of origin simply does not work here.118 The
importance of the community‘s beginning is dwarfed—if it exists at
all—by its role in nurturing its members now so that they may give
back to the community and strengthen their commitments to each
other.
The language of community (as opposed to an aggregate of
individual interests) and of shared values (as opposed to individual
beliefs or incentives) appears in recent cases, especially those
concerning international intellectual property and the United States‘
relations with our foreign friends. Consider Golan v. Holder,119 a
district court case holding that section 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (as amending the Copyright Act at 17 USC §104A)
violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
because it restores copyright to foreign works that lost protection for
failure to comply with U.S. copyright formalities.120 The Golan court
stated that the plaintiffs had vested First Amendment interests in the
formerly copyrighted works because they had fallen into the public
domain. ―In the United States, [our copyright law] includes the
bedrock principle that works in the public domain remain in the
public domain.‖121 The court reasoned from reliance interests as well
from the value of a robust public domain.122 The district court
embraces communal property (once owned by an individual, now
shared by all) as so vital to the First Amendment‘s purposes that it
facilitates judicial redistribution of property from the private sphere to
the public. The court accomplishes this contrary to explicit
congressional mandate and at the cost of aggravating our foreign
relations. But it does so because our community grows richer with
each addition to the public domain.123

human fulfillment).
118 Cf. Karl Marx, Introduction to the Grundrisse, (―All production is appropriation of
nature by the individual within and through a definite form of society. In that sense it is a
tautology to say that property (appropriation) is a condition of production. But it becomes
ridiculous, when from that one jumps at once to a definite form of property, e.g. private property
(which implies, besides, as a prerequisite the existence of an opposite form, viz. absence of
property). History points rather to common property . . . as the primitive form, which still plays
an important part at a much later period as communal property.‖), in KARL MARX: A READER 7
(Jon Elster ed., 1986).
119 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010).
120 Id. at 1172–77.
121 Id. at 1177.
122 Id. at 1173 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d
1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007)).
123 The district court decision was reversed on appeal. See Golan, 609 F.3d at 1076. In
June 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Section 514 of the Uruguay
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Sharing is the operative form of ownership in the commons. It is
neither an activity nor a value we discard when we begin to acquire
property and retreat from reliance on the commons. Indeed, the
Access Movements reclaim sharing as a central virtue of our
advancing civilization. ―Sharing nicely‖ has become a theory of
economic production.124 Forms of sharing vary in openness: from the
GPL,125 F/OSS,126 various open educational platforms,127 and online
scholarship and data banks,128 to the different iterations of Creative
Commons licenses,129 robust theories of trademark fair use,130
proposals for more widespread compulsory license schemes,131 and

Rounds Agreement Act, which restored U.S. copyright to some foreign copyright holders,
served substantial governmental interests in advancing the expressive and economic interests of
authors and was narrowly tailored to address cognizable harm. Id. at 1084. As between reliance
parties and authors, the court of appeals sided with the authors saying that the ―‗First
Amendment . . . protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one‘s own speech; it bears
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people‘s speeches.‘‖ Id. (quoting
Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003)). This reasoning retreats from the language of
community and the importance of the commons as expressed by the district court.
124 Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as
a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004); see also Debora Halbert,
Poaching and Plagiarizing: Property, Plagiarism, and Feminist Futures (suggesting that we
―emphasize a framework focused on sharing and exchange instead of personal ownership‖), in
PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 111,
118 (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999).
125 See Licenses, GNU OPERATING SYS., http://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html (last
updated Apr. 27, 2010) (providing information about the GNU General Public License for free
software).
126 See What Is F/OSS?, FREE / OPEN SOURCE RES. COMMUNITY, http://opensource.mit
.edu/what_is_os.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (explaining what free/open source software is).
127 See, e.g., MIT OPENCOURSEWARE, http://ocw.mit.edu/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2010) (providing free course materials from MIT).
128 See, e.g., SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, http://www.ssrn.com (last visited Oct.
30, 2010) (declaring that SSRN is ―devoted to the rapid worldwide dissemination of social
science research‖). The Open Access Chemistry Data Bank is another example. See Richard
Van Noorden, Microsoft Ventures into Open Access Chemistry, ROYAL SOC‘Y CHEMISTRY (Jan.
29, 2008), http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/News/2008/January/29010803.asp (discussing
research into creating an open-access chemistry data bank). These kinds of web-based platforms
are growing rapidly and are too numerous to list here. For a directory of open-access journals,
see DIRECTORY OPEN ACCESS JOURNALS, http://www.doaj.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
129 See About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Oct.
30, 2010) (providing ―free licenses and other legal tools to mark creative work with the freedom
the creator wants it to carry‖).
130 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives
Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 81–87 (2004) (discussing the ramifications of free use);
Katyal, supra note 90 (exploring the effect of intellectual-property laws on gender equality in
the context of fan fiction); McGeveran, supra note 29 (suggesting a broad simplification of the
nuanced and complex limitations used in applying the fair-use doctrine); Rebecca Tushnet,
Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114
YALE L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that even nontransformative copying, such as for research or
educational purposes, can be good and that we should be wary of the fair-use doctrine‘s
exclusion of these activities).
131 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
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equitable benefit sharing of plant genetic resources.132 Widespread
sharing of this kind promotes transparency and participation (both
democratic virtues), as well as increased production.133 It also
promotes connectivity and intimacy, which are emotional experiences
most people seek and cherish134 but which few people consider
central to promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. The
features of sharing—transparency, participation, connectivity and
intimacy—are building blocks for a sustainable community.135 In this
community, the origin of the shared objects is significantly less
important (if important all) than the fact that they are made and
shared.136
Recent cases concerning the first-sale doctrine in both trademark
and copyright law exemplify this tendency. In Vernor v. Autodesk,
Inc.,137 for example, the plaintiff, Timothy Vernor, (who supports
himself selling merchandise on eBay138) was held not to infringe the
defendant, Autodesk‘s exclusive right to distribute its copyrighted

FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 202–03 (2004) (suggesting a ―governmentally administered
reward system‖ which would benefit consumers and artists).
132 Keith Aoki & Kennedy Luvai, Reclaiming “Common Heritage” Treatment in the
International Plant Genetic Resources Regime Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 52–55
(2007) (discussing the 2004 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources).
133 Craig, supra note 87, at 234 (―Employing the notions of dialogism and the relational
self that have emerged from feminist scholarship, I hope to show how we can re-imagine the
author not as source, origin, or authority, but rather as participant and citizen. We can reimagine authorship as the formation of individual identity and the development of self and
community through discourse. These ideas illuminate the nature of authorship as a social and
formative process, but they also offer the foundation for a coherent justification of copyright. If
speech/dialogue makes us social beings, copyright law, which aims to encourage creativity and
exchange, thereby encourages meaningful relations of communication and participation with
others.‖); see also Aoki & Luvai, supra note 132, at 64–66 (discussing the advantages of an
open-source model for plant genetic resources); Boyle, supra note 101, at 10 (asserting that one
goal of cultural environmentalism is to render things visible).
134 See West, supra note 83, at 18 (―[I]ntimacy is . . . something human beings ought to do.
Intimacy is a source of value, not a private hobby.‖); see also id. at 65 (describing one goal of a
reconstructive feminist jurisprudence as showing ―the value of intimacy—not just to women,
but to the community—and the damage done—again, not just to women, but to the
community—by the law‘s refusal to reflect that value‖).
135 See Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourses on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783,
803 (2006) (discussing Professor Lange‘s conception of the public domain as ―‗a status that
arises from the exercise of the creative imagination . . . confer[ring] [on authors] entitlements,
privileges and immunities‘ to appropriate from other works in the course of creating new ones‖
(omission and alterations in original) (quoting David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 463, 474)).
136 See, e.g., Daniel B. Smith, What is Art For?, N.Y. TIMES M AG., Nov. 16, 2008, at 39,
41 (―Unlike a commodity, whose value begins to decline the moment it changes hands, an
artwork gains in value from the act of being circulated—published, shown, written about,
passed from generation to generation—from being, at its core, an offering.‖).
137 No. C07-1189RAJ, 2009 WL 3187613 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2009), vacated, 621 F.3d
1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
138 Id. at *1.
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software despite a license to the contrary. Vernor acquired the
software from an architectural firm, who had purchased it from
Autodesk. Vernor claimed that despite language in the software
license that allegedly retained ownership title in the software with
Autodesk, the initial purchase of the software and its subsequent
transfer were sufficient to trigger the first-sale doctrine under 17
U.S.C. § 109(a). That section provides, ―Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular
copy . . . lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy . . . .‖139 Canvassing a variety of district and
appellate court cases on the subject, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington considered the transaction
―holistically‖ and determined that, because Autodesk had no intention
of ever retrieving the software from the original licensor, ownership
was transferred despite contract language to the contrary. The court
dismissed Autodesk‘s attempt to define ―ownership‖ as ―unrestricted
ownership‖ and instead embraced an industry standard tailored to the
software business.140
On appeal, the district court‘s decision was reversed but not its
holistic approach: evaluating the transaction in context to ascertain
whether or not ownership was established in the purchaser of the
software. Central to both decisions in Vernor was the concern over
the harms and benefits that flow from secondary markets in software.
Autodesk argued that interpreting ―owner‖ in section 109(a) as
anything less than ―unrestricted ownership‖ would send retail prices
skyrocketing because software producers would raise prices to
compensate for the resale market. Vernor argued that interpreting
section 109(a) to favor the copyright owner would destroy all
secondary markets and therefore hurt consumers further, reduce
competition, and eviscerate the first-sale doctrine via contract.141 The
district court‘s ruling in favor of Vernor recognized the changing
nature of ownership with regard to software—a kind of shared or
overlapping ownership. The ruling facilitates more markets for the
sale of software and thus, explicitly increases access. The appellate
ruling does not dispute this changing landscape, but held that
139 17

U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
2009 WL 3187613, at *8.
141 Id. at *14. To this the court said, ―These contentions make for an interesting debate.
Autodesk‘s suggestion that consumers will be harmed by rising retail prices . . . does not address
the concomitant price benefit in the form of reduced resale prices. Although Autodesk would no
doubt prefer that consumers‘ money reaches its pockets, that preference is not a basis for
policy.‖ Id.
140 Vernor,
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Autodesk had not relinquished control over the software sufficient to
transform the software licensee into an owner per the language of the
Copyright Act.
The court in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto142 applied similar
reasoning to the sale of promotional compact disks that purport to
restrict resale with the language ―Promotion Use Only—Not for
Sale.‖ This case also resulted in a ruling favoring the secondary
retailer and not the copyright holder.143 Noting that: (1) the only
apparent benefit to the alleged license prohibiting resale is to restrain
trade and (2) the ―economic realities‖ of the situation illuminate no
intention by UMG to regain possession of the compact disks, the
court held that UMG transferred ownership of the compact disks and
thus exhausted their exclusive right to distribute the copyrighted
materials contained therein. Like the district court decision in Vernor,
Augusto favors the small business person and facilitates the secondary
market, expanding access to the copyrighted material at lower prices.
It also recognizes that, in the digital age, exclusivity may be
impracticable and the ―economic realities‖ of our more fluid
marketplace demand that we adjust our expectations of property
relations to include less than absolute ownership.
Copyright is not alone in the shifting of the ownership paradigm to
accommodate broader access and sharing among varied markets and
users. In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.,144 both the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York and the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit (affirming) squarely sided with the consumer (and
not the mark holder) in absolving eBay of contributory liability.145
This case begins with the unremarkable proposition that a trademark
owner cannot impede the sale of a genuine good bearing a true mark,
even if the sale is unauthorized by the mark owner.146 The first sale of
the trademarked good exhausts the exclusive rights in controlling
future sales. The holding then broadens its reach to conclude that,
although eBay may have been aware that counterfeit Tiffany products
were being sold on its site, absent particularized knowledge of
142 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008). As this article is going to press, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court‘s ruling and reasoning. See UMB Recordings, Inc. v. Troy
Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).
143 Id. at 1065.
144 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), (disputing eBay‘s liability for sales of counterfeit
Tiffany products on its website), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010),
petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3129 (U.S. Aug. 27, 2010) (No. 10-300).
145 Id. at 511. This decision was affirmed on appeal on all issues except false
advertisement, for which the court of appeals remanded. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600
F.3d. 93, 112–14 (2d Cir. 2010).
146 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
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specific counterfeit goods, eBay cannot be held liable for their sale on
its site.147 Upholding a defendant-friendly interpretation of the
contributory-liability test from Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc.,148 the district court and the court of appeals
blessed the business practices of one of the largest and most
successful internet marketplaces to date. Prudentially avoiding the
likelihood that a liability determination would chill continued activity
in a vibrant marketplace, this case encourages ongoing access to, and
participation by, large-scale intermediaries who are the engines of our
new digital world.149 Although not a shift in trademark law per se, the
leeway this court granted eBay (and, by consequence, other similar
marketplaces and UGC sites, such as YouTube150) weakens the
exclusivity that intellectual-property-rights holders once enjoyed.
The district court could have found Tiffany liable for contributory
infringement, given that eBay admitted it had some knowledge that
counterfeit Tiffany products were being sold on its site.151 The court
could have forced eBay into a more costly liability structure by
limiting the scope of access to secondhand goods and requiring
stricter monitoring of potentially fraudulent behavior, turning eBay
into a kind of trademark police on behalf of Tiffany and other product
manufacturers. But it did not. As the law stands, since the court‘s
holding was affirmed on appeal, Tiffany has, in essence, been forced
to share its mark with eBay and other resellers and advertisers of
Tiffany‘s products on more generous terms. The court shifted focus
from a determination about the actual origin of the marked good
(whether it is a genuine article or not) to whether eBay had sufficient
knowledge about the product‘s origin to determine whether the
market should remain open. Assuming the absence of false
advertising or sponsorship, this is a win for consumers and users. As
long as eBay is not misleading as to the good‘s source and it remains
unaware of particular fraudulent offers for sale, the distribution
channels grow unfettered benefiting those seeking access.

147 Id.

at 509–10.
U.S. 844 (1982).
149 See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103 (―To impose liability because eBay cannot guarantee the
genuineness of all of the purported Tiffany products offered on its website would unduly inhibit
the lawful resale of genuine Tiffany goods.‖).
150 See Viacom Int‘l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010)
(granting defendants‘ motion for summary judgment because they fell within the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act‘s safe harbor provision and holding that they were not deprived of
protection merely because they required that copyright holders manually request that videos be
removed from their websites or because they removed only specific clips identified in DMCA
notices).
151 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 106.
148 456
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3. A New Incentive Story
The Access Movements claim that sharing promotes the progress
of science and the useful arts. This is in contrast to the traditional
claim that exclusivity (private ownership) incentivizes creativity and
innovation and that strong property rights are necessary for a robust
marketplace. By disputing this foundational claim, the Access
Movements challenge us to rethink how and why people work and
innovate. ―[N]ew forms of creative output, from the advent of open
source collaborative networks to garage bands, remix culture, and the
World Wide Web itself, undermine utilitarian intellectual property
law‘s very premise: that intellectual property rights are necessary to
incentivize creation.‖152 The best manufacturing may no longer occur
in assembly-line fashion.153 Nonlinear production is touted as some of
the most innovative today. Examples include open-source software,
weblogs and wikis that collapse previously assumed stable
distinctions between maker and user,154 or writer and reader.155
The value of these new innovations is not necessarily understood
in a traditional economic way.156 The Access Movements recognize
that ―many artists care more about protection of the fundamental
integrity of their work than the financial gain the work will
realize.‖157 People create for audiences and for their own
satisfaction—for people and community, not necessarily for
money.158 Many people create for no reason but to play;159 ubiquitous
152 Sunder, supra note 7, at 260–61 (footnotes omitted); see also Greg R. Vetter, The
Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563, 631 (2004) (positing
that the open-source movement‘s ―energizing, volunteer-capturing force is a fighting response
against power and control of proprietary, traditional software‖).
153 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 3 (2006) (arguing that these new methods of production
―will emerge . . . at the core, rather than the periphery of the most advanced economies‖).
154 See ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005) (discussing the rise of the
user-innovator); see also Aoki & Luvai, supra note 132, at 63 (describing the
indistinguishability of users and developers of software and of plant genetic resources).
155 See generally Burk, supra note 90 (describing hypertexting).
156 See Boyle, supra note 101, at 12 (stating that traditional economic theory assumes a
reductionist definition of innovation).
157 Lacey, supra note 117, at 1584; cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
584 (1994) (discussing the problem as it relates to fair use and citing to Samuel Johnson‘s
famous saying, ―[N]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.‖ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
158 See Lacey, supra note 117, at 1536 (―I also question the validity of the universal
assumption that financial incentives are the only reason artists create works of art.‖).
159 See Boyle, supra note 101, at 21 (describing the institutional ecology of commonsbased production as laborious and having the ―features of the intensely satisfying, self-directed,
play characteristic of the work of the artist and academic‖); see also Cohen, supra note 16, at 93
(describing group-based activity on the Internet where ―meaning emerges
through . . . opportunities for play‖).
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behavior that Rebecca Tushnet describes as ―excessive, beyond
rationality.‖160 Crowded fan-sites and globally networked virtual
worlds are further evidence of this behavior. From this ―play‖ comes
beloved avatars as well as path-breaking developments in science and
technology that are valued for fulfilling personal desire or public
need. The incentive to produce such things, according to the Access
Movements, comes from the pleasure of participation161 in a network
of volunteers more than any promise of recompense.162 Focusing on
these motivations, the Access Movements squarely challenge certain
assumptions about market capitalism, including the public-goods
problem that has shaped intellectual-property law for centuries.163
Numerous examples of this volunteer economy populate the Internet.
Jonathan Zittrain of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at
Harvard University recently described such behavior in a talk called
―Minds for Sale,‖ in which he canvasses activities ranging from
―turking‖ (for free or for pennies) to online contests whose prizes
range from mere accolades to modest monetary awards.164 Even some
court cases discussing the right of publicity touch on the disconnect
between intellectual-property law‘s incentive theory and a celebrity‘s
investment in his or her identity and reputation.165
160 Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 (2009).
161 Sunder, supra note 7, at 263 (borrowing Sun Microsystem‘s slogan the ―Participation
Age‖ to describe a feature of the countermobilization).
162 See BENKLER, supra note 153, at 59–90 (describing peer production and sharing).
163 For a description of the public-goods problem, see FISHER, supra note 131, at 199. For
challenges to theoretical underpinnings of market capitalism for intellectual property rights, see,
for example, Aoki & Luvai, supra note 132, at 59; Cohen, supra note 28, at 351; Kal Raustiala
& Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion
Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006).
164 For a video of the talk in which Zittrain describes the range of activities as pyramidshaped, with the high-value awards appearing infrequently at the top, and the voluntary
contributions (or working for free) at the wide bottom, see Jonathan Zittrain, Minds for Sale,
YOUTUBE, 10:00—21:00 (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dw3h-rae3uo.
―Turking‖ is the activity sponsored by Mechanical Turk, a crowdsourcing marketplace from
Amazon Web Services that uses computers to coordinate humans to do work that computers
cannot do. See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, http://www.mturk.com (last visited Oct. 30,
2010). For a description of ―turking,‖ see Jason Pontin, Artificial Intelligence, with Help from
the Humans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2001, at B5.
165 In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003), Tiger Woods
complained that the unauthorized use of his image in connection with art prints, calendars, and
trading cards violates the Lanham Act and his right of publicity under state law. The court
questioned whether a property-like right in a celebrity‘s identity is necessary given that ―the rate
of return to stardom in the entertainment and sports fields is probably high enough to bring forth
a more than ‗adequate‘ supply of creative effort and achievement.‖ Id. at 933 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n, 95 F.3d 959,
974 (10th Cir. 1996)); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th
Cir. 1993) (Kozinsky, J. dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (―Overprotecting
intellectual property . . . stifles the very creative forces it‘s supposed to nurture.‖).

12/30/2010 8:34:29 PM

232

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1

4. Community Building and the Public Interest
In contrast to the solo inventor, the romantic author, or the
comparison shopper, the agents in this new social and digital
economy explicitly build off each other to innovate further.166
Participation, therefore, requires taking care to maintain the
community and its members. It is no surprise, then, that the Access
Movements speak more often in terms of responsibility and fairness
than of autonomy.167 The Access Movements undermine the model of
isolated, rights-bearing individuals, who, in the aggregate, allegedly
form a sustainable community of property owners.168 Instead, the
countermobilization advocates for responsible ownership, which
requires contemplating the effects of private ownership on other
people.169 Private ownership is not eschewed; but it is subordinated to
the primary value of taking care of others on the assumption that
doing so will make everyone better off.170 This requires a ―sense of
trust among potential contributors‖ to the community,171 which
generates strong multilateral ties among them. Talking this way, the
countermobilization ―reimagine[s] the author [or the inventor] not as
166 See

BENKLER, supra note 153, at 59–90 (discussing peer production and sharing).
e.g., Phillips, supra note 114, at 374 (asserting that the focus should not be on
private ownership but on ―how to create differentiated interpersonal ties that are just, equal,
socially beneficial, and satisfying to the participants‖); see also BOYLE, supra note 33, at 28, 31
(suggesting we focus on egalitarianism in our debate over access to information and discussing
how fairness is already in the vocabulary of information regulation).
168 See Craig, supra note 87, at 250 (―The subject matter of copyright is not the
independently produced and individually owned work-as-object, but rather a contribution to the
continually evolving culture in which the author exists and by which she is constituted.‖);
Lacey, supra note 117, at 1549 (arguing that the aggregation of individual autonomous interests
will not add up to a shared interest of the community); see also Carpenter et al., supra note 10,
at 1027–29 (positing a new theory of property for indigenous cultural property claims that are
structured around collective obligations and stewardship (peoplehood) rather than individual
rights (personhood)).
169 See Sunder, supra note 7, at 284 (―Utilitarian‘s central failure, of course, is its neglect
of distribution. . . . The utilitarian approach to intellectual property does not ask: Who makes the
goods? Who profits, and at whose expense? . . . A utilitarian calculus that presumes overall
welfare in the aggregate ‗doesn‘t tell us where the top and the bottom are‘ . . . .‖ (footnote
omitted) (quoting MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 61 (2000))).
170 See Boyle, supra note 101, at 18–19 (praising the Adelphi Charter whereby rights in
intellectual property are not created or extended without evidence of their benefits and the
burden of proof is on those who propose extensions); see also Cohen, supra note 28, at 374
(―First, do no harm.‖); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1538 (1993)
(arguing that when the public‘s claims to property conflict with those of a laborer, the public‘s
claims should prevail because some part of the laborer‘s work should be left for others if the
laborer wants to appropriate his or her work).
171 Niva Elkin-Koren, Exploring Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of a Worthy
Pursuit, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION
LAW 325, 334 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
167 See,
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[a] source, origin, or authority, but rather as a participant and
citizen‖172 to whom the community owes a duty and by virtue of
which the community continues to thrive.173
Ironically, patent law (arguably one of the strongest forms of
intellectual property) is the area in which this kind of change has been
most recent and extensive. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.174
the Supreme Court held that patent owners must satisfy the fourfactor test traditionally used to determine whether injunctive relief is
warranted when seeking permanent injunctions for patent
infringement.175 This decision upset a longstanding practice in patentinfringement cases, in which patent owners were entitled to a
permanent injunction as a remedy for infringement.176 Instead, the
Supreme Court emphasized the equitable nature of the remedy and
the considerable discretion provided to the trial court. The
MercExchange decision has opened the field of patent practice to the
very real possibility that ongoing infringing activity (―access‖) may
be countenanced if, for example, such use is in the public interest.177
Indeed, Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence makes this point explicitly:
For [some] firms, an injunction . . . can be employed as a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that
seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. When the patented
invention is but a small component of the product the
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public
interest . . . .
The equitable discretion over injunctions, granted by the
Patent Act, is well suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid
technological and legal developments in the patent system.178

172 Craig,

supra note 87, at 234.
Kapczynski, supra note 6, at 835 (describing the belief held by the open-sourcesoftware community that society benefits when it has free access to knowledge).
174 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
175 Id. at 391–92.
176 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837
(2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 631,
632 (2007).
177 See MercExchange, 547 U.S. at 391 (citing the four-factor test). Of particular import is
factor four: ―the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.‖ Id.
178 Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
173 See
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A survey of cases since the 2006 decision confirms this state of
affairs. The majority of cases in which courts deny permanent
injunctions are those where the patent owner is a nonpracticing entity.
In these cases, in effect, compulsory licenses (court-determined
royalty rates) are issued instead of injunctions. These allow future
access to the patented product under the auspice of promoting
innovative uses.179 Strengthening the four-factor test weakens the
leverage of the patent holder in licensing negotiations, and therefore
places patented technology into the marketplace at lower rates,
making it more accessible to the public. In other words, where
patented products are used by innovators who are not direct
competitors of the patent owner, district courts, following the
Supreme Court‘s direction, facilitate use by these various
communities.
Another example of the ―public trust‖ function of developing
intellectual-property rights arises in the area of geographical
indications and cultural property.180 With regard to cultural property,
or what Barton Beebe calls ―traditional cultural expressions,‖
indigenous communities assert intellectual-property-like rights to
protect their cultural heritages against ―dilution‖ by encroaching
communities.181 This is emphatically not to incentivize the production
of more cultural expression, but instead to preserve the special culture
and the community that exists already. Court decisions from Australia
are some of the best-known examples of this kind of cultural-property
protection for the purpose of ―social and religious stability‖ of certain
aboriginal communities.182 The controversial geographical-indicationof-origin protection (GI) under the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is intended to be a
protectionist measure for local (native) community-based cultural
products that facilitates trade, rather than inhibits it.183 The various
179 Beckerman-Rodau,

supra note 176, at 654–55.
Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 809, 869 (2010) (discussing an ―emerging element of international development‖ in which
traditional producers seek to emphasize ―the precise geographical, historical, and human
circumstances of their goods‘ manufacture‖).
181 Id.
182 Foster v Mountford (1976) 29 FLR 233, 236 (Austl.); see also Milpurrurru v Indofurn
Proprietary Ltd. (1994) 54 FCR 240, 280 (Austl.) (levying damages for infringement that
partially reflected the ―harm suffered‖ to some of the aboriginal applicants ―in their cultural
environment‖). For a discussion of this practice, see, for example, Peter J. Chalk & Alexander
Dunlop, Indigenous Trade Marks and Human Rights: An Australian and New Zealand
Perspective, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 956 (2009); Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of
Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997).
183 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 22.1, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art.
22.1, 108 Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299, 308. GI protection under TRIPS became effective in
180 See

12/30/2010 8:34:29 PM

2010]

COMPARATIVE TALES

235

national GI laws that comport with TRIPS are intended to ―allow
cultural diversity to thrive and artisans to remain in their villages,
resisting the pull of city industry.‖184 This trademark-like protection is
neither consumer-oriented nor antidilutive in scope. It is based on
deeply held concerns over community sustainability and cultural
diversity. As Madhavi Sunder has explained, ―[P]oor people‘s turn to
property is . . . about social and cultural values . . . . People, rich and
poor alike, want recognition of their creativity and contributions to
science and culture. This capacity for innovation, work, and cultural
sharing is part of what makes us human.‖185
Be it through injunctive relief or geographic indications, the
Access Movements‘ vocabulary structures new relations for the role
of culture in law-making and law-enforcing, recognizing the mutual
constitution of the two. As Julie Cohen has written, ―If the network is
us, then it isn‘t a separate entity.‖186 Of course, the idea that law is
constitutive of culture and vice versa is not new.187 But these notions,
for example, that the community and not the individual is the origin
of value and that property by default should be communally held
appear to be sea changes in intellectual-property policy. They put
cultural sustainability on par with legal precedent. And they remind
us that our rights and responsibilities toward each other (our laws)
reflect and constitute the erasures, possibilities and power that
structure our social relations. There is no way to designate an outside
of culture by which to judge the law as separate. Similarly, there is no
means outside of the law to assess its neutral effect on cultural
production.188 Origins designating a center or a beginning or a
predicate cause, have no place in this future for intellectual property.
B. Questioning Hierarchies
The above Section described how the countermobilization speaks
not of origins, but instead, of communities. Indeed, the Access

1996 for developed countries and in 2006 for the least developed countries. Irene Calboli,
Expanding the Protection of Geographical Indications of Origin Under TRIPS: “Old” Debate
or “New” Opportunity?, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 181, 190 (2006). For a discussion of
the controversy over GIs, see Kal Raustiala & Stephen R. Munzer, The Global Struggle Over
Geographic Indications, 18 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 337 (2007).
184 Sunder, supra note 7, at 300.
185 Id. at 301.
186 Cohen, supra note 16, at 92.
187 See ROGER B. M. COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY: LEGAL IDEAS IN THE
MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 24–25 (2006) (citing nineteenth- and twentieth-century theorists).
188 See Sunder, supra note 7, at 320–21 (contesting a binary view of culture, inside and
outside).
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Movements seem to speak a different language than that of the origin
stories of intellectual property. The Access Movements discard
common dualities that populate intellectual-property talk, such as
public versus private, individual versus group, culture versus nature,
maker versus user, monetized versus free, autonomous versus
interconnected.189 The lack of these dualities and the devaluation of
origins deflates the hierarchies embedded in the stories of the how
and why of intellectual-property protection. As such, the Access
Movements speak in terms of antisubordination (dismantling unjust
hierarchy) and substantive equality. By focusing on the importance of
practical access, the Access Movements value private ownership only
insofar as it does not interfere with self-actualization, sustainability
and community well-being. By talking this way, the Access
Movements infuse the debates over intellectual-property protection
with a more focused attention on, and complex understanding of, how
and why people work and innovate in communities.190 Exposing the
traditional heuristics of intellectual-property law around which the
origin stories are structured as a mistake provides the
countermobilization with the further opportunity to invent new, clear
directives.191 This Section describes these directives and their
organization around an antisubordination principle with examples
from recent court decisions and advocacy.
1. Reversing Default Rules of Exclusivity
The Access Movements proceed with a presumption against
enforcing and extending exclusive rights in intellectual property. As
James Boyle has written, ―[R]ights should not be created or extended
without evidence of their benefits, and . . . the burden of proof is on
those who propose extensions . . .‖192 Boyle and others call for
189 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 79, at 183 (discussing mind/body and nature/culture
dualities).
190 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C.
L. REV. 433, 438–39 (2003) (showing how ―the language of legal doctrine makes a significant
difference with respect to the organization and the application of the doctrine‖ and explaining
how language has a normative power).
191 See Séverine Dusollier, The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons
v. Copyright, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 271, 285 (2006) (―Exercising copyright differently from
what has become the usual, and almost normative, way might prove that the
control/remuneration rhetoric that tends to dominate the copyright discourse of today is in fact
not natural but rather comes from constructed habits, due to the copyright industry‘s efforts. If
that rhetoric is revealed as merely one choice, the imperative of making copyright an
increasingly stronger instrument of control may well be undermined. Such a discovery could resignify the meaning of copyright. The subversive strategy of Creative Commons would then be
successful.‖).
192 Boyle, supra note 101, at 19.
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shifting the burden in the traditional analysis of intellectual-property
protection from one where exclusive rights are presumed necessary to
incentivize individuals to invent or create, to one where exclusive
rights must be justified by more than an appeal to human nature or a
cost/benefit analysis.193 This shifts the focus from enclosure to access,
on the understanding that the traditional economic model of
intellectual property is either outdated in light of the technological
revolution or inherently flawed given our better appreciation of the
mechanisms of creativity and the public domain.194 The revitalization
of the four-factor test for an injunction in the patent context is a case
in point. The fallout from the Supreme Court‘s MercExchange
decision has been that, absent direct competition, the patent holder is
not likely to retain exclusive control over the use of the invention, but
will be entitled to compulsory license fees instead. The lower courts‘
emphasis on the public interest (presumably taking their cue from
Kennedy‘s concurrence) further underscores the shifting of the
burden to the property holder to justify exclusivity.195
Another recent patent case, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Electronics, Inc.,196 hints at this shifting of rights from the patent
holder to the patent users.197 Relying on ―longstanding doctrine of
patent exhaustion,‖198 the Supreme Court reversed the Federal
Circuit‘s limitations on the doctrine and affirmed the rule that patent
exclusivity is exhausted upon the first sale of an object embodying the
patent.199 Key to the decision in Quanta was the fact that a License
Agreement and Master Agreement between LG Electronics and Intel
purported to limit the exhaustion of LG‘s patent rights to Intel‘s
customers, including to its manufacturing partners such as Quanta.
But the Court held that the license failed to limit LG‘s patent rights
193 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 99, at 105–07 (discussing problems with the government‘s
rationale in its White Paper entitled ―Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual
Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights‖).
194 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008) (arguing that justification for trademark dilution lacks
foundation in light evidence from cognitive science); see also BENKLER, supra note 153, at 25
(canvassing the access movement literature that responds to the second enclosure movement);
see id. at 59 (describing the evolving model of peer production that challenges traditional
theories of economic behavior).
195 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (stating that one of
the factors in the four-factor test is that ―the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction‖); see also Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 176, at 632 (discussing eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange).
196 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
197 See e.g., id. at 2118 (describing dangers of the ―end-run around exhaustion‖ one of
which is the restriction of the patented products‘ use by the putative purchaser).
198 Id. at 2115.
199 Id. at 2117–18.
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and the Master Agreement provided ineffective notice to third
parties—no implied license was created by the agreement. The Court
considered its decision a return to first principles, citing the 1917 case
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.200
But to some it may also be understood as warning to patent holders
that, in light of the more complex contracting and manufacturing in
the twenty-first century and the importance of facilitating networks in
today‘s economy (as opposed to strengthening enclosures), contracts
purporting to limit exhaustion will be construed narrowly. This
principle facilitates use as much as it demeans the private property
right.201
2. Substantive Equality Evaluations
Putting a thumb on the scale for access and shifting the burden to
the intellectual-property rights holder in order to demonstrate a need
for exclusivity has the benefit of requiring critical evaluation of the
effects of conventional intellectual-property protection. It also focuses
attention on the relations of power that such protection perpetuates.
For some participants in the countermobilization, this evaluation
demands
restructuring
intellectual-property
protection
to
accommodate serving the underserved and meeting identified needs
with a response of access.202
Questions of power imbalances and sustainable culture are
apparent in recent high-profile intellectual-property disputes. A patent
case argued in February 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York combined such diverse actors as the
ACLU, the Public Patent Foundation, the Association for Molecular
Genetics, and the American Society for Clinical Pathology against the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics.203 Myriad
200 243 U.S. 502 (1917). ―[T]he right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale,
the article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free
of every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon it.‖ Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2116
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Motion Picture Patent Co., 243 U.S. at 516).
201 Quanta‘s rule might be easily worked around by careful contract drafting. See infra pp.
54–55. Nonetheless, the case stands as another example of an evolving default in intellectualproperty law whereby property owners cannot assume exclusivity is the status quo.
202 See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 33, at 28 (proposing a focus on equality rather than private
ownership, the former being described as ―having to do with the relative powerlessness of the
group seeing information access or protection‖); Aoki & Luvai, supra note 132, at 57
(proposing an open-source movement for plant genetic resources to facilitate necessary access
to them for biodiversity and community sustainability); Michael W. Carroll, The Movement for
Open Access Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 756 (2006) (explaining why the law and
legal scholarship should be freely available on the Internet and how copyright law and
copyright-licensing practices should facilitate the achievement of this goal).
203 Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Genetics owns patents that cover two breast cancer gene sequences
called BRCA1 and BRCA2. Myriad therefore controls the genetic
testing for these cancer genes and has prevented nonlicensed entities
(doctors, scientists, and hospitals) from testing for these genes to
determine courses of treatment and possible cures.
Before the district court, the attorneys argued that the ―law of
nature‖ doctrine barred the patentability of the gene sequences.204 But
the rhetoric surrounding the lawsuit—the dominant story being told
about this dispute—is that needed access to medicine and scientific
research is being barred.205 The image evoked (albeit an exaggerated
one) is one of predatory pharmaceutical companies that fail to
distinguish between price gouging and sustainable profits, preventing
sick women from benefiting from the scientific successes of our era.
While the court‘s rhetoric is not this stark, its denial of the
defendants‘ motion to dismiss alludes to concerns of access to
medicine and the intellectual-property balance as an issue of health
and welfare of women.
The widespread use of gene sequence information as the
foundation for biomedical research means that resolution of
these issues will have far-reaching implications, not only for
gene-based health care and the health of millions of women
facing the specter of breast cancer, but also for the future
course of biomedical research. . . .
The novel circumstances presented by this action against
the USPTO, the absence of any remedy provided in the Patent
Act, and the important constitutional rights the Plaintiffs seek
to vindicate establish subject matter jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs‘ claim against the USPTO.206
204 See Complaint at 3–4, Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 04515), 2009 WL 1343027 (―[The
Association for Molecular Pathology] supports attaching intellectual property rights to true acts
of invention such as new therapeutics, diagnostics or technology platforms, but believes a single
gene or a sequence of the genome is a product of nature and should not be patentable.‖); see
also Mark Fass, “Law of Nature” or “Invention”? Court Mulls Patentability of Genes, N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 3, 2010 (reporting that during a hearing regarding the parties‘ motions for summary
judgment, the plaintiffs‘ attorney argued that the defendants had ―patented the human body and
‗a law of nature‘‖).
205 Am. Civil Liberties Union of Utah Found., Inc., ACLU of Utah Statement (May 12,
2009),
available
at
http://www.acluutah.org/UtahStatementOnGenePatentLawsuit.pdf
(―Myriad‘s monopoly on the BRCA genes makes it impossible for women to obtain other tests
or get a second opinion about their results, and allows Myriad to charge a high rate for their tests
over—$3,000, which is too expensive for some women to afford.‖).
206 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 370, 383. The Court granted
summary judgment against the patent holder and held the patents invalid under Section 101 of
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Shifting the burden of proofs to those who seek to expand
exclusivity in intellectual-property holdings is a matter of putting the
sustainability of certain communities and their cultural practices
first.207 This does not have to mean that exclusivity is disfavored, only
that it is one of many tools used to attain cultural recognition of
underprivileged groups and the redistribution of wealth and power
between developed and developing nations.208 As Madhavi Sunder
reports when describing a ―cultural heritage license‖ drafted by
various Access Movement organizations who recognize the
unpalatable choices faced by many indigenous peoples:
―We currently face a binary decision between
extremes,‖ . . . ―either leaving culture vulnerable to
exploitation and appropriation or creating legal and technical
barriers that hermetically seal bodies of knowledge.‖ The
[cultural heritage] license seeks to offer a ―third option‖
facilitating communication under terms reasonably acceptable
to both open knowledge and traditional knowledge
constituencies.209
Sunder explains that ―[t]he turn to intellectual property and
contract . . . is spurred out of concerns for respect, community, and
cultural participation, not just efficiency.‖210 Where efficiency would
play a major role in the analysis of whether and how to protect
intellectual property under a traditional analysis,211 the

the Patent Act on March 29, 2010. Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
207 See Arewa, supra note 8, at 167 (discussing ―narratives of appropriation‖ and
international intellectual property‘s response to them); Boyle, supra note 101, at 6–7 (critiquing
the economic model of intellectual property as built on the flawed assumption of perpetual
growth); Cohen, supra note 28, at 374 (asserting that the first principle of the future of copyright
law should be: ―First, do no harm.‖); Michael J. Madison, Intellectual Property and Americana,
or Why IP Gets the Blues, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 677, 702 (2008)
(demonstrating how law ―serves an important but indirect role in constructing sustainable
cultural practices‖); Samuelson, supra note 135, at 783, 803 (discussing the importance of an
open public domain).
208 See Sunder, supra note 7, at 273 (discussing ―new intellectual property claims by the
poor‖); see also Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Anarchist in the Coffee House: A Brief Consideration
of Local Culture, the Free Culture Movement, and Prospects for a Global Public Sphere, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 205, 210 (―Attempts at forging a global public sphere
discount the importance of cultural recognition in favor of procedural equality . . . .‖)
209 Sunder, supra note 7, at 326 (footnote omitted) (quoting Eric C. Kansa et al., Protecting
Traditional Knowledge and Expanding Access to Scientific Data: Juxtaposing Intellectual
Property Agendas via a “Some Rights Reserved” Model, 12 INT‘L J. CULTURAL PROP. 285, 305
(2005)).
210 Id.
211 See Boyle, supra note 99, at 96–97 (discussing Joseph Stiglitz and Sanford Grossman‘s
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countermobilization replaces efficiency with substantive equality.
And substantive equality—or the antisubordination of people and
their culture through redistribution of or access to use social goods—
is a theme that motivates the Access Movements.212
The lawsuit against Google alleging that its book search project
infringes U.S. copyrights is yet another example of a recent
intellectual-property dispute where the rhetoric of equality and access
overwhelms the usual discussions of incentive and individual
rights.213 In the process of negotiating a class-action settlement, the
parties must respond to objectors who, although appreciative of
Google‘s ―mission of increasing access to all the world‘s books,‖214
believe Google‘s attempt to control access through its corporate
structure undermines the core principles on which copyright law is
based. Certain French and German parties object to the
―‗uncontrolled, autocratic concentration of power in a single
corporate entity,‘ which threaten[s] the ‗free exchange of ideas
through literature.‘‖215 Academic authors call attention to the
possibility of future price gouging for works that would otherwise be
in the public domain, available through Creative Commons licensing,
or free under fair use.216 Other objecting parties decry Google‘s
recommercialization of creative works that were dedicated to the
public domain, creating new cost barriers to access where the authors
had intended to level them.217

article about the tension between incentive and efficiency in the market to create and spread
information).
212 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 87, at 248 (―The notion of the dialogic therefore calls for an
investigation into copyright, the power relations that it sustains and perpetuates, and the
discourses of value and authority that it informs and replicates. . . . [by] silencing counter
discourses, attributing authority to speakers, and allocating power over speech.‖); see also
COHEN, supra note 83 (manuscript ch. 9, at 192) (suggesting that Martha Nussbaum‘s
―capabilities approach‖ to equality and social justice be a guide to restructuring intellectual
property rights in our digital age); Aoki & Luvai, supra note 132, at 69 (in proposing an opensource network for plant genetic resources, cautioning to recognize the relative wealth and
power disparity in the reordering that will occur among developing nations and rights holders).
213 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
214 Robert Darnton, Google and the New Digital Future, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 17, 2009,
at 82, 82 (internal quotation omitted).
215 Id. at 83.
216 See Objection of Academic Authors to the Google Book Settlement, at 2, Authors Guild
v. Google, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 05 Civ. 8136(DC)), available
at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/samuelson.pdf (giving ―numerous examples of terms in
the Settlement Agreement that are antithetical to academic author interests‖); Objection of Free
Software Foundation, Inc. & Karl Fogel to Proposed Settlement at 1–2, Authors Guild v.
Google, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 05 Civ. 8136(DC)), available at
http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/fsf.pdf (discussing reasons why books should be published
freely through the Free Software Foundation).
217 Objection of Free Software Foundation, at 2.
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These examples highlight a rhetoric that privileges equality and
access over incentives for ownership and exclusivity. Rather than
asserting that there would be nothing of value to share absent
intellectual-property protection, these examples focus on the value of
substantively equal access as a health and welfare maximizing
principle.
3. Constrained Freedom
In both the patent and copyright contexts, the appeal to substantive
equality (a just balance of wealth) requires reexamining the notion of
freedom in the analysis of the whether and how to protect exclusive
rights to intellectual property. Rejecting a purely utilitarian approach
to maximizing freedom, the countermobilization recognizes that
absolute freedom through trickle-down effects is unlikely, if not
impossible.218 The present system of intellectual-property protection
has produced a world in which none of us are entirely free and some
of us are significantly less free than others.219 The relative inequities
in ownership and access to intellectual property that these cases
discuss arise because the freedom to create is not exercised in a
vacuum. Being ―free‖ can mean only ―free within preexisting
constraints.‖220 For freedom to be meaningful, it must be
compromised (i.e. regulated), so as to maximize practical access for
use and safeguard social goods.221
The notion of compromising freedom for access is central to many
of the trademark ―use‖ cases222 and to the copyright search-engine
218 See Sunder, supra note 7, at 284 (discussing the shortcomings of the utilitarian
approach); see also Boyle, supra note 1, at 34, 66 (―[S]ome of the theorists of the e-commons
do not see restraints on use as anathematic to the goal of freedom; indeed, they may see the
successful commons as defined by its restraints.‖).
219 See Sunder, supra note 7, at 313–14 (citing Martha Nussbaum‘s capabilities critique of
utilitarianism as pointing to the latter‘s failure to account for the provision of basic human
freedoms, such as ―the right to life and health, to more expansive freedoms of movement,
creative work, and participation in social, economic, and cultural institutions‖).
220 Id. at 305 (describing this phenomenon with regard to cultural signification as ―the
exercise of cultural agency within a context of discursive hegemony‖).
221 See Boyle, supra note 101, at 9 n.12 (describing this commons as a ―mutually
reinforcing zone of freedom‖); Séverine Dusollier, Sharing Access to Intellectual Property
Through Private Ordering, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1391, 1407 (2007) (―[C]ommons-based
initiatives ‗create a self-binding commons rather than an unrestricted public domain.‘‖ (quoting
Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for
University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1072 (2005))); cf. Ann Bartow, Open
Access, Law, Knowledge, Copyrights, Dominance and Subordination, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 869, 884 (2006) (asserting that open access itself does little to empower access to legal
information and that intermediaries are still necessary); Elkin-Koren, supra note 171, at 326
(critiquing Creative Commons‘ core perception of freedom as ideologically fuzzy and
potentially unworkable given the reliance on volunteerism).
222 For trademark ―use‖ cases, see Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129 (2d
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cases, such as Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc..223 In the
trademark cases, the weight of case law facilitates unauthorized use of
trademarks for the purposes of pop-up advertising because the use in
question (to generate search results) is not the kind of ―trademark
use‖ the Lanham Act requires to trigger an infringement action.224
These decisions arguably permit much more crowded, diverse, and
overlapping Internet traffic around commonly used terms, be they
brand names or not. The widening of access to ―information,‖ broadly
construed, prevails over a mark owner‘s putative right to exclude
others from using their marks. Similarly, in Perfect 10, Inc., the court
held that Google‘s use of thumbnail images in the image search
results does not infringe the copyright of the underlying webpage
because Google‘s use is ―highly transformative.‖225
[A] search engine transforms the image into a pointer
directing a user to a source of information. . . . [Like a
parody,] a search engine provides social benefit by
incorporating an original work into a new work, namely, an
electronic reference tool. Indeed, a search engine may be
more transformative than a parody because a search engine
provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a
parody typically has the same entertainment purpose as the
original work.226
In both of these contexts of trademark use on the Internet and
reproduction of copyrighted work online, the freedom provided to
intellectual-property owners to exclude yields to the policy preference
of access (which is also judicially emphasized) when it serves the

Cir. 2009) (―Google . . . argues . . . that the inclusion of a trademark in an internal computer
directory cannot constitute trademark use.‖); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d
400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005) (―The primary issue . . . is whether the placement of pop-up
ads . . . constitutes a ‗use‘ under the Lanham Act.‖); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc.,
293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 764 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (―[T]he inclusion of plaintiffs‘ marks in
defendant‘s Directory is not a use in commerce.‖); U-Haul Int‘l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (E.D. Va. 2003) (granting WhenU.com‘s motion for summary judgment
―because Plaintiff fail[ed] to show how a pop-up advertisement . . . is a ‗use‘ of U-Haul‘s
trademarks‖).
223 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
224 See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 401 (holding that no Lanham Act use exists
where (a) the defendant does not place the mark on any product, good, or service; (b) the mark
is not used in any way that would indicate source of origin; and (c) where the defendant‘s use of
the plaintiff‘s mark is internal and not communicated to the public).
225 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165.
226 Id.
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interests of developing and disseminating information for the public
benefit.227
The Access Movements advocate ―development as freedom,‖228
asking: What kind of development do we seek through intellectual
property? The answer: ―Development must entail not only economic
growth, but also a life that is culturally fulfilling.‖229 The
countermobilization provides substance to the constitutional mandate
of ―progress.‖ The ability to own one‘s creations is only a means
through which individuals may demand, and communities may
provide, the more fundamental of human rights. Some have suggested
that the recent expansion of intellectual-property rights is like a ship
off course, and that the countermobilization returns the focus of the
intellectual-property balance to the public interest, including human
health, dignity, liberty, fairness, and distributive justice.230 Some say
this rhetoric is simply a return to first principles of intellectual
property that have gone awry because of changing technological
contexts. Others will argue that it is a genuine revolution of those first
principles. Both angles make sense, as does the benefit of straddling
both poles when arguing on behalf of clients.231 But insofar as the
Access Movements seek to address the ―disparate social effects of
intellectual property on local and global social relations,‖232 they
appeal to substantive equality above individual rights, which requires
dialing back the liberal value of freedom from regulation to make
room for a more robust freedom to access and use. In light of our
liberal legal culture, this is a paradigm shift. It is what some have
called ―a new socialism.‖233
227 See id. at 1166 (―The Supreme Court . . . has directed us to be mindful of the extent to
which a use promotes the purposes of copyright and serves the interests of the public.‖).
228 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (arguing that open dialogue,
civil freedoms, and political liberties are prerequisites for sustainable development).
229 Sunder, supra note 7, at 314; see also Amartya Sen, How Does Culture Matter?, (―The
freedom and opportunity for cultural activities are among the basic freedoms the enhancement
of which can be seen to be constitutive of development.‖), in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 37,
39 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds., 2004).
230 See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 7, at 315–16 (―[I]ntellectual property is being reenvisioned as limited by the property and personal rights of others, not just by economic
incentive theory alone. Intellectual property rights are increasingly being understood as
property rights that structure social relations.‖).
231 See infra discussion in Part IV.
232 Id. at 311; see also Katyal, supra note 90, at 466, 468 (discussing how permitting slash
fiction as a noninfringing use of underlying copyrighted works would ―equalize the authorial
monopoly of the creator in favor of a more dialogic and dynamic relationship between
producers and consumers in the process‖); id. at 470 (suggesting that the protection of
copyrighted works from their use in slash fiction ―perpetuate[s], rather than disable[s], the
current state of gender inequity in the content industries‖).
233 For evidence of a paradigm shift, see Kevin Kelly, The New Socialism, WIRED MAG.,
Apr. 2009, at 116, 118 (―We‘re not talking about your grandfather‘s socialism. In fact, there is a
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4. New Forms and New Relations
The variety of new forms of intellectual property birthed from the
Access Movements evidences the value of substantive equality and
antisubordination, eschewing freedom from regulation in exchange
for freedom to use and share. Wikis, noncommercial weblogs, art that
uses trademarked fashions or goods,234 and fan fiction are just a few
examples of nonmarket productivity that also generate significant
value, albeit measured in nontraditional economic fashion.235 Their
existence depends on a high level of tolerance for using (or donating)
intellectual property to a common cause. Freedom to use a Wiki or
enjoy a fan site exists only because someone else donated their
resources or liberated their proprietary content.
The developing-nations license from Creative Commons (or the
―DevNat‖) is another new form of intellectual property that balances
exclusivity with substantive equality. The DevNat allows persons in
developing nations to have ―a wide range of royalty-free uses of [the
copyrighted work] . . . while retaining their full copyright in the
developed world.‖236 The DevNat ―recognizes a variety of impulses
among licensors that: many refuse to make money off the backs of the
world‘s poorest people; they believe that the poorest peoples have a
human right to access knowledge materials; and intellectual-property
rights can be a tool for restructuring social relations.‖237 The GPL and
other Creative Commons licenses are further examples of new forms
of property relations that attempt to take stock of twenty-first-century
digital culture and expectations for a more global and connected
world where resources may be scarce, hierarchical stratifications

long list of past movements this new socialism is not. It is not class warfare. It is not antiAmerican; indeed, digital socialism may be the newest American innovation. While old-school
socialism was an arm of the state, digital socialism is socialism without the state. This new
brand of socialism currently operates in the realm of culture and economics, rather than
government—for now.‖).
234 See, e.g., Gimme 5... Art Prints That Include Registered Trademarks, VISUAL BLAST
GALLERY (Oct. 14, 2008, 12:02 AM), http://www.fatbombers.com/?p=877 (posting art made
with trademarks); Susan Scafidi, All’s Well that Ends Well: LV v. Nadia Plesner, COUNTERFEIT
CHIC (Aug. 28, 2008, 9:08 AM), http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2008/08/alls_well_that_ends
_well_louis.php (discussing the artwork of Nadia Plesner, who is dedicated to remixing and
sampling).
235 See BENKLER, supra note 153, at 59–127 (2006) (discussing nonmarket production,
especially as it relates to internet technology).
236 Press Release, Matt Haughey, Creative Commons, Developing Nations Copyright
License Frees Creativity Across the Digital Divide (Sept. 13, 2004), available at
http://creativecommons.rog/press-releases/entry/4397. For specific terms of license grant, see
Creative Commons Developing Nations 2.0 License Legal Code, CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/devnations/2.0/legalcode (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
237 Sunder, supra note 7, at 289.
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more intense, and therefore finding an equilibrium to achieve a
measure of equality imperative may be more difficult.238
And of course, there are plenty of user-generated innovations and
content platforms that are commercial enterprises built on the back of
other people‘s intellectual property. These new items of commerce
are made not with the permission of the owner of the underlying work
(be it a patented invention, copyrighted expression, or trademarked
good); they are made and distributed on the assumption that their
work does or should fall within an exemption to exclusivity.
Examples in this vein are ubiquitous once you begin searching. Some
include Google‘s AdWords239 and image-search capabilities.240 Opensource software development is another common example.241 And
user-generated devices (USG)—medical devices or sports
equipment—are another.242 For a contemporary and controversial
example, consider the company RiffTrax, a website merchandiser that
sells parodic audio commentaries of well-known films that, when
synchronized with the playing of the spoofed film, arguably create a
new work (and arguably an infringing derivative work). RiffTrax also
sells ―RiffTrax On Demand,‖ downloadable films that are free of
DRM (digital rights management) with the parodic audio commentary
already embedded. RiffTrax‘s popular feature, the iRiff, is a thirdgeneration user-generated product. It allows fans to create their own
―riffs‖ and sell them on RiffTrax‘s website for a fifty-percent profit
share.243
Each of these developing forms of intellectual property is spun
from a growing tolerance born of the Access Movements for more
porous intellectual-property boundaries. It is key to the ongoing
success of these new forms of intellectual-property relations that
contributors recuperate their investment of time and energy, not
necessarily with money but by experiencing an enrichment of their
238 At the same time, the GPL and Creative Commons licenses do not forsake a measure of
control over both downstream and upstream uses of the underlying property, but they retain
control in order to prioritize values such as attribution, choice, and transparency. For more on
any apparent inconsistency in this position, see infra Part IV.
239 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009) (vacating the district
court‘s grant of Google‘s 12(b)(6) motion because Google‘s AdWords activity is a ―use in
commerce‖ of Rescuecom‘s trademark within the meaning of the Lanham Act).
240 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the display of thumbnail images of copyrighted photographs, in response to users‘ image
searches, is a fair use).
241 Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome are two successful examples.
242 See Aaron K. Chatterji et al., Physician-Industry Cooperation in the Medical Device
Industry, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1532 (2008) (discussing medical devices); Eric von Hippel,
Horizontal Innovation Networks—by and for Users, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 293 (2007)
(discussing rodeo-kayaking products).
243 See RIFFTRAX, http://www.rifftrax.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
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community by continued and dedicated participation. Rather than
writing for or manufacturing goods within a specific community,
writing and manufacturing constitutes the community.244
This is certainly true with regard to Wikis and weblogs. It is
equally true of the DevNat. For business models based on opensource or user-generated products, the community of participants is
essential to their livelihood. There is little incentive to create
hierarchies within these communities, which might effectively
exclude participants or restrict the generative nature of them. 245
Openness defines these communities and makes them work as well as
they do.246 To differentiate users, or subordinate access to the
preferred participation by others, would undermine the purpose and
effectiveness of these projects.247
5. The Value of Diversity
The last value animating the Access Movements‘
antisubordination rhetoric and property relations is diversity: valuing
differences among community members. The Peer-to-Patent project,
begun in 2007 by the PTO, exemplifies this principle.
This project opened the U.S. patent examination process to the
public. According to its one-year-anniversary review, the Peer-toPatent system ―involves enabling and integrating citizen participation
to identify and assess critical prior art. This system is . . . the first
governmental ‗social networking‘ website designed to solicit public
participation in the patent examination process.‖248 Its primary
innovation is in sharing information between the public and the patent
examiners, recognizing that each does not have perfect information
and that neither is necessarily better at searching prior art references.

244 See Burk, supra note 90, at 527 (describing how blurred distinctions between authors
and readers create shared textual interpretations that can constitute ―collaborative and collective
modes of understanding‖); see also JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE
EMPIRE OF FORCE 9 (2006) (describing how the language of law has direct public consequences
because it is ―where public power is given shape and reality‖). This is, of course, the way law
works as a discursive practice, generally, and it is what a constitution does specifically.
245 See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1975, 1980–82
(2006) (describing the generativity of the Internet); id. at 1975–77 (sketching concerns that
stability and security will trump openness that characterizes the Internet).
246 See id. at 1975–80 (describing how the openness of the Internet is an essential feature
on which to build and the glue that holds it together).
247 See id. at 1979–80 (proposing that regulation of Internet and PC architecture
(―affirmative technology policy‖) is necessary to keep the Internet meaningfully open and to
thwart misuse of the Internet by authoritarian regimes).
248 CTR. FOR PATENT INNOVATIONS, N.Y. LAW SCH., PEER-TO-PATENT: FIRST
ANNIVERSARY REPORT 3 (2008), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent
/P2Panniversaryreport.pdf.
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This system encourages the public to research and upload
publications—known in patent law as ―prior art‖—that
inform the patent examiner about the novelty and
obviousness of a pending application . . . . While patent
examiners have ready access to prior art in the form of issued
patents, they do not have the same ready access to non-patent
prior art literature, such as published articles, software code,
and conference presentations. It is in identifying this nonpatent prior art that public participants can add the greatest
value.249
Crucial to the ethos of this project is recognizing the value of
diverse areas of expertise beyond the USPTO and keeping the lines of
communication open between these diverse communities. A mutual
deference and respect for the diverse ideas of the public participants
(―citizen-experts‖)250 and the patent examiners is necessary for the
Peer-to-Patent project to succeed.
Another such example, and one that has endured much longer, is
the Creative Commons licensing scheme. One impetus behind the
Creative Commons was to correct the assumption behind modern
copyright that one size of exclusivity fits all.251 Where the Access
Movements assert that the incentive model behind intellectual
property does not reflect the reasons why, nor the manner in which,
people innovate, the Movement actors have also asserted that each
person has his or her own incentive.252
The appeal to diversity is on several levels: diverse incentives,
diverse permitted uses, diverse actors and agendas, diverse reasons
for protection or donation, diverse products and cultures.253 This is
249 Id.

at 4.
at 5. The Peer-to-Patent project was halted in June 2009 for lack of funding due to
the 2008–2009 recession. See CTR. FOR PATENT INNOVATIONS, N.Y. LAW SCH., PEER-TOPATENT: SECOND ANNIVERSARY REPORT 3 (2009), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu
/communitypatent/CPI_P2P_YearTwo_lo.pdf (―[D]ue to the broad economic downturn of the
past year we find that we are unable to continue the Peer-to-Patent project at this time.‖). The
USPTO recently announced a second launch of this program in October 2010. See Press
Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Launches Second Peer to Patent Pilot in
Collaboration with New York Law School (Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://www.uspto.
gov/news/pr/2010/10_50.jsp.
251 See Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons as Conversational Copyright, (arguing that
copyright‘s one-size-fits-all approach is simplistic because creators produce new works for a
variety of reasons and, therefore, they want different protections from the law) in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 445, 447 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
252 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 1, at 46 (―Each person has his own reserve price, the point
at which he says, ‗Now I will turn off Survivor and go and create something.‘‖).
253 For example, the impetus behind compulsory licenses for patented medicines in the
case of need recognizes that some communities can afford to pay the rent on the patent while
250 Id.
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not a model of individuality (―everyone is their unique person‖), but a
model based on the value of aggregated and communal efforts (―the
more diversity, the better the whole‖). It is a model that resonates
with theories of participatory democracy and the processes that
safeguard it.254 For example, some suggest that the ―digital
architecture‖ of the Internet Age ―enhances [our] ability to dissent
and to participate in making culture. . . . [I]t assists us as we seek ‗to
think for [ourselves].‘‖255 Others assert that ―ideological diversity‖
will be ―crucial for the success‖ of the Access Movements.256 Still
others hope that the future of intellectual property can help promote
biodiversity.257 Formal features of the Movements (―many-to-many
interactivity,‖258 peer-to-peer networks, authoring software) and its
content (wikis, blogs, fan fiction) are examples of connectivity and
dialogue fueled by diverse participants and ideas. Each of these
examples requires that we loosen the reigns of exclusivity and
embrace the ethos of sharing, which, in turn, requires tolerating, if not
also harnessing, the differences among us.
By appealing to the value of diversity to upend entrenched and
unproductive hierarchies, the Access Movements signal the fact
intensiveness of their proposal for change.259 This may come as

others cannot; some community circumstances demand access to use on practical terms
(immediately and at low cost) while others‘ circumstances are less dire. See Christopher A.
Cotropia, Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the United States’
Decision in eBay v. MercExchange, (describing TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme), in
PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 557 (Toshiko
Takenaka ed., 2008). For a recent dispute regarding compulsory licenses for essential
medicines, see News Release, Essential Action, International Coalition of Public Health
Advocacy Groups Sends Letter to Colombian Government Supporting Kaletra Compulsory
License Request from Civil Society (Aug. 6, 2008), available at http://www.essential
action.org/access/index.php?/archives/170-Health-Groups-Worldwide-Support-Colombian-Callfor-Compulsory-License-on-Kaletra.html#extended (―On 16 July, 2008, an alliance of
Colombian civil society groups filed a request for their government to issue an open compulsory
license on the life-saving anti-retroviral drug lopinavir/ritonavir[, which is manufactured by
Abbott Laboratories,] in order to enable access to generic versions of the drug, which will create
competition and lead to more affordable prices.‖).
254 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New
Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 683 (1997) (―Copyright disclaimers [on fanfiction sites] are manifestations of democracy in action; articulating norms about justice in the
shadow of formal law.‖).
255 Sunder, supra note 7, at 276 (last alteration in original) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT,
Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, in BASIC WRITINGS OF KANT 133, 136 (Allen
W. Wood ed., Thomas K. Abbott trans., 2001) (1784)).
256 Elkin-Koren, supra note 171, at 326.
257 Aoki & Luvai, supra note 132, at 53.
258 ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION : HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING
INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 15 (1999).
259 This is what James Boyle calls determining ―the placement of the line.‖ Boyle, supra
note 1, at 64; see also Cohen, supra note 28, at 374 (describing how copyright policy should
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unwelcome news to some. Certainly the cases concerning the firstsale doctrine in copyright law or trademark law,260 along with patent
exhaustion and equitable remedies in patent-infringement cases,261
will require much more fact intensity at the trial level to withstand
appellate review. Courts describe the ―economic realities of the
transaction‖ to cue an advocate‘s attention to particular facts in light
of the doctrine.262 Indeed, all of these court decisions are keen to bind
the doctrinal holdings to the particular facts of the case. But
considering and applying those facts in a learned and nuanced manner
in the trial court, where facts are best considered, is what law and
justice have always required. Surely, we do not seek bright lines be it
in intellectual property or elsewhere—especially those that fail to
reflect the growing appreciation for our complex reality—at the
expense of justice.263
To be clear, not all Access Movement voices explicitly call for
equality (or antisubordination) in the proposed rebalancing of
intellectual-property entitlements through changes in our law and
social customs. But the Access Movements do uncover flaws or
paradoxes in law and culture, the basis of which is a mistaken belief
(or a myth,264 or, perhaps, an irrational prejudice) about how people
are or should be living and progressing together. In so doing, whether
consciously or not, the Access Movements discourse advocates a
redistribution of wealth and power in the form of more intellectualproperty access.
IV. THE LAST STAND
The Access Movements advocate for an intellectual-property
future that embraces antiorigin and antisubordination principles.
Nonetheless, they also appear committed to certain core values of
liberal legal politics. This last Part describes how, despite the Access

consider the ―context-dependent character of both consumption and creativity‖).
260 E.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008);
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (W.D. Wash. 2008), vacated, 621 F.3d 1102
(9th Cir. 2010). For a trademark case analyzing the contextual nature of trademark‘s first-sale
doctrine in light of consumer experience and expectation, see Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C. v.
Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
261 See discussion supra notes 195–201.
262 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114.
263 See Craig,
supra note 87, at 267 (―[S]implifying dichotomies of liberal
thought . . . creates false dilemmas that impede our ability to engage in genuine debate and that
obstruct our path toward nuanced solutions.‖); see also Zittrain, supra note 245, at 1979
(―[D]rawing a bright line against nearly any form of increased Internet regulability is no longer
tenable.‖).
264 See Silbey, supra note 9, at 232 (describing origin myths).
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Movements‘ difference from dominant intellectual-property
discourse, some of its law and policy arguments nevertheless contain
certain generic markers of the intellectual-property origin story. These
markers are the idealized values of autonomy and consent. This Part
concludes with a question: Does holding fast to these core ideals of
liberal legalism frustrate the Access Movement‘s goal of renovating
intellectual-property relations to accommodate practical and equitable
access (either case-by-case or statutorily)? Or, are these ideals
necessary for change to be embraced by the broader community?
Given that discarding these ideals is improbable in light of their
principal role in U.S. law, can these ideals be modified in a way that
makes reform likely and successful? This Part compares historical
social movements that coalesced around changed legal and cultural
discourses as a way to think through these underlying questions.
A. Autonomy and the Rights Revolution
As the above discussions illuminate, much of the Access
Movements‘ appeal to community and antisubordination recognizes
the possibility of, and hope for, self-development and fulfillment
through expression. Self-development and fulfillment require some
measure of control over our lives—where we go, what we do, with
whom and what we interact. This is a matter of autonomy: accessing
information, expression, and technological innovation to pursue our
own version of what is good and what is the public welfare. So herein
lies one challenge the Access Movements face: How do the Access
Movements embrace the goal of meaningful autonomy—what Julie
Cohen has describes as ―self-articulation‖ and ―boundary
management‖265—at the same time as they decry as fiction the
autonomous self in the digital age?266 The Access Movements trumpet
265 COHEN,

supra note 83 (manuscript ch. 6, at 126–27).
Cohen, supra note 28, at 371–73 (describing the ―situated user‖ instead of
privileging an autonomous subject). Cohen recognizes this puzzle. Indeed, much of her recent
work has been devoted to working through it. E.g., COHEN, supra note 83 (manuscript ch. 5, at
95). Cohen has ably and insightfully drawn out the internal contradictions of Access Movement
themes of autonomy in her forthcoming book, calling attention to her own difficulties with the
subject. She writes:
266 See

Even as [privacy scholars] highlight the dynamic nature of self-formation, however,
these ―constitutive privacy‖ scholars continue to insist on the existence of an
autonomous core—an essential self identifiable after the residue of influence has
been subtracted. The problem, however, is not simply that ―autonomy‖ is constituted
over time and by circumstances; it is that including ―autonomy‖ in the definition of
the ultimate good to be achieved invokes a set of presumptions about the
separateness of self and society that begs the very question that we are trying to
answer.
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the good that autonomy achieves (self-development, self-articulation).
Indeed, they seem to presume that the greater the practical access to
intellectual property, the more fulfilled and expressive we, as
members of our communities, will be. But how does this work?
Autonomy of the kind described by the Access Movements requires
both a freedom from regulation (formal or informal) as well as a
freedom to access and use social goods (legally protected or not).
The cases that focus on copyright‘s first-sale doctrine (like Vernor
v. Autodesk and UMG Recordings v. Augusto) exemplify the push and
pull of idealized autonomy and practical, messy contingencies. These
decisions did not dispute traditional conceptions of ownership:
possession and control. To be sure, the word ―owner‖ in the
Copyright Act is a trigger for the exhaustion principle,267 but
ownership need not mean exclusive control to well argue or justly
decide these cases. Indeed, if the Access Movements‘ rhetoric of
sharing is to be taken seriously, it crafts a different default for
property rights. The Access Movements celebrate the benefit of
ownership as bringing people together around possessions in
common. Why were Vernor and Augusto litigated to reify
―ownership‖ into dominion and control? Likely because the
defendants believed that it was the least contentious and the most
palatable argument on which they might win. That is, reifying
ownership as dominion and control is the path of least resistance to
advocating a change in the law that would protect the ―have nots‖ (the
putative licensees) in these cases.268
This makes sense as a litigation strategy. Small steps have often
accumulated to achieve monumental change. Consider the civil rights
movement and the oft-told story of the NAACP‘s campaign to
incrementally litigate racial desegregation and eventually overturn
Plessy v. Ferguson269 in Brown v. Board of Education.270 The
NAACP did not first file suit to desegregate elementary schools. It
began with cases that sought to desegregate graduate schools, a

Id. (citations omitted).
267 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (―Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.‖).
268 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 95, 103–04 (1974) (describing the legal system as favoring
the ―haves‖ over the ―have nots‖).
269 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
270 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For one such description of the NAACP‘s legal campaign, see
MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP‘S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925–50 (1987).
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conscious choice to seek change incrementally and in ways that at
first appeared less threatening to those who might resist. As Thurgood
Marshall (one of the architects of Brown) put it:
Those racial supremacy boys somehow think that little kids of
six or seven are going to get funny ideas about sex and
marriage just from going to school together, but for some
equally funny reason youngsters in law school aren‘t
supposed to feel that way. We didn‘t get it but we decided
that if that was what the South believed, then the best thing
for the moment was to go along.271
Likewise, the intellectual-property cases discussed above take
incremental steps toward changing our property rights and relations.
Certainly, on their face, they are not revolutions in intellectualproperty doctrine. Are they simply pointing out different
circumstances (complex contracting situations) in which the statutory
default rules of first sale do not yet apply? Or do they evidence an
influence of the Access Movement values? Are these cases speaking a
new language or using the old to get to a new result? Quanta
Computer v. LG Electronics, while similar to the district court
decisions in Vernor and Augusto in favoring the putative licensee (the
user), nonetheless built into its holding an escape hatch: more clearly
drafted contract terms would save the patent owner who wants to
limit patent exhaustion.272 (The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the district
court in Vernor v. Autodesk, further reified the notion of consenting
parties by emphasizing the specificities of the license terms and the
benefit of the bargain.273) If the freedom of contract is an effective
antidote to copyright and patent-exhaustion principles, these cases
will produce very little change by way of practical access. Clear
contracts of adhesion will dominate the intellectual-property
landscape and, unless a strict doctrine of privity prevails, users will be
said to have knowingly entered into restrictive-use agreements, lest
their autonomy and individuality to freely contract be questioned.
In trademark law the ideal of consumer autonomy reclaims
whatever extension of access users and consumers achieved through
271 PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 895 (5th ed. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ALFRED KELLY,
THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASE, QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPE THE CONSTITUTION 253
(John Garraty ed., 1964)).
272 See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 n.7 (2008) (―[W]e
express no opinion on whether contract damages might be available even though exhaustion
operations to eliminate patent damages.‖).
273 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
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noninfringement rulings. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp.274 is a good example of this. Dastar Corp. held that authors (in
this case, a film studio) are precluded from using trademark law to
protect against a false designation of origin (misattribution) when the
work‘s copyright has expired. This is because ―origin‖ under the
Lanham Act ―refers only to the manufacturer or producer of the
physical ‗goods‘ that are made available to the public‖275 (here the
videotape) and ―[t]he consumer who buys a branded product does not
automatically assume that the brand-name company is the same entity
that came up with the idea for the product . . . and typically does not
care whether it is.‖276 In the same breath as the Court limits the reach
of trademark rights, it emboldens the consumer as an überrational
actor who considers the brand names on videocassettes when
purchasing a documentary film. Who are these filmgoers Justice
Scalia is so sure exist? The consumer of film who is well versed in
the reputation of videotape manufacturers is a legal fiction, one that
resurrects the sovereign consumer of traditional trademark law.277
Where some cases might have proaccess results, they nonetheless
exalt individual autonomy, risking the recuperation of exclusivity at
the expense of sharing and community. Failing to change this
underlying language and rationale could stymie true change. Consider
the individual-rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. It is
considered a disappointment by some for its instantiation of
individuals (and individuality) at the expense of groups or community
welfare.278 Some think that the failure in the 1960s and 1970s to
change the language of individual rights to group rights, and instead
to base the rights revolution on the notion of individualism (―treating
everyone like an individual‖), has led to an insurmountable challenge
today.279 The failure to recognize group rights may have doomed the
274 539

U.S. 23 (2003).
at 31.
276 Id. at 32.
277 See Beebe, supra note 55, at 2022–23 (―[T]rademark doctrine has based itself upon a
largely mythical ‗consumer construct.‘ . . . [T]he ‗sovereign consumer‘ is a utility-maximizing
agent of unbounded rational choice.‖); see also Silbey, supra note 9, at 361 (discussing same).
278 For discussions of the difference between individual and group rights, see JOSEPH R AZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 176, 207–08 (1986) and for individual rights specifically, see
Lawrence M. Friedman, American Legal Culture: The Last Thirty-Five Years, 35 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 529, 531–32 (1991). For a critique of the civil rights movements in this regard, see
WILLIAM A. DONOHUE, THE NEW FREEDOM: INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM IN THE
SOCIAL LIVES OF AMERICANS 11 (1990). For a critical look at the wisdom of court decisions
protecting individual employee choice at the expense of stable collective bargaining
relationships see James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and
the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 947 (1996) and Frances E. Olsen, Statutory
Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1984).
279 See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Shattered Mirror: Identity, Authority and Law, 58
275 Id.
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completion of the civil rights revolution in terms of its goals of
equality and antidiscrimination.280
What is to be done? Presumably, the autonomy that the Access
Movements call for could be something less sovereign and romantic
than the autonomy called for by the origin stories of intellectual
property. Indeed, one could argue that Vernor, Augusto, Quanta, and
even Dastar, do not instantiate the idealized autonomy of liberalism
but a more limited form of freedom. Perhaps, then, autonomy is not
the right term or concept.281 Perhaps modified autonomy—contingent
and fluctuating—is what the Access Movements really seek.282 If this
is the case, we must start speaking in modified ways. There is little to
be gained—and much confusion to be had—by using this old
language in our new world.283
It is possible that talking about autonomy in the idealized way of
liberal legalism will not obstruct a broadening access to intellectualproperty rights. There is some evidence that discursive shifts and
changed social relations can occur by adapting or translating old
language for new concepts. For example, in the human-rights arena,
some explore how, through the use of the term ―slavery‖ in the
context of trafficking in women, the international legal community

WASH. & LEE L. REV. 23, 37 (2001) (describing those challenging the modern culture of
individualism as ―gallantly swimming upstream, against a mighty, almost irresistible current‖).
280 See id. (claiming that the civil rights movement erroneously focused on group rights).
281 Martha Fineman writes about subordinating autonomy to equality, or at least resisting
an ―understanding of equality as [a] dependent value, shaped through the dominant lens of
autonomy.‖ Martha Albertson Fineman, Evolving Images of Gender and Equality: A Feminist
Journey, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 453 (2009). She lists questions to ask about tradeoffs
between equality and autonomy to assess the justice of certain policy choices against the status
quo. See id. Her questions resonate with those asked by Access Movement actors regarding the
proper balance for intellectual-property protection.
282 See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing ―constrained freedom‖); see also COHEN, supra note
83 (manuscript ch. 5, at 92–97). Cohen describes a current dissatisfaction with the replacement
of autonomy with the socially constructed subject, in part because of the ontological and
epistemological instability that poststructuralism seems to claim is inevitable in our social lives.
Id. at 96–97. Although I acknowledge the scholarly reformer‘s impatience with
poststructuralism, I am not entirely sympathetic. The instability of meaning (for and about
ourselves in our communities) that poststructuralism says is inevitable is based on the very
banal fact of our social lives: that who we think we are and what we think we want can only be
understood within the context of social relations. Although some might assert that material and
existential desires (for goods and states of being) flow from each individual like lava from the
core of the earth, the notion of autonomy (a desired state of being) only makes sense in light of
its varying degrees, situated and constructed by diverse influences. The very notion of autonomy
depends on a society full of human beings and institutions for it to be recognized as a value at
all. The idea that it exists or is meaningful outside of these complex contexts makes no sense.
Our sought-after autonomy must be contingent and unstable if we live in a world that is as
dynamic as our twenty-first century appears to be.
283 See Madison, supra note 27, at 439 (―Our use of language reflects the way in which we
organize the world of our experience.‖).
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broadens its understanding of systemic violence against women, and
redefines war crimes under international law.284 And, over a decade
ago, political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink showed
how transnational advocacy networks (international networks of
nongovernmental organizations) effect local change by creating
alternative channels of international communication.285 Keck and
Sikkink wrote that these ―networks . . . reframe international and
domestic debates, changing their terms . . . . When they succeed,
advocacy networks are among the most important source of new
ideas, norms, and identities in the international system.‖286
Importantly, these scholars do not document a wholesale shift in
terminology that facilitates the development of a new human rights
framework. They do describe a ground-up evolution of shifting
norms, based on ideals of civil freedom and equality rooted in earlier
social movements, such as abolition and women‘s suffrage.287
Perhaps, then, the Access Movements can learn from what Harold
Koh calls the ―transnational norm entrepreneurs,‖288 those that offer
more deliberate translations and discursive adoptions for Movement
actors. This would require in litigation as well as organizational
development that we arrive at a consensus on certain fundamental
terms. We are not yet there, but if the cases are any indication, there is
a linguistic shift taking place, and perhaps we are moving in the right
direction. More deliberate rhetorical and narrative choices by the
reform actors may be in order.
B. Consent and the Specter of Choice
Much of the reform sought by the Access Movements takes place
against the backdrop of volunteerism and private ordering. As
discussed above, some cases could be seen as incrementally adapting
intellectual-property doctrine to an access-friendly framework. And
284 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Sisterhood, Slavery, and Sovereignty: Transnational
Antislavery Work and Women’s Rights Movements in the United States During the Twentieth
Century, (describing how ―[d]eployment of nineteenth century terms—‗sisterhood‘ and
‗slavery‘—remains useful . . . to work powerful transformations of law and practice‖), in
WOMEN‘S RIGHTS AND TRANSATLANTIC ANTISLAVERY IN THE ERA OF EMANCIPATION 19
(Kathryn Kish Sklar & James Brewer Stewart eds., 2007).
285 See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) (discussing advocacy
networks‘ roles in creating local change through international communication).
286 Id. at x.
287 For other similar work in the human-rights arena, describing how litigation and court
decisions are part of a discursive norm-creative process, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
288 Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J.
1397, 1409 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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there are some explicit calls for statutory reform—compulsory
licensing and new exemptions to infringement.289 But the fastest
growing evolution of intellectual-property norms seems to be via
copyleft organizations, such as Creative Commons, and mechanisms
such as viral licensing.
The attraction and strength of these contractual aspects of the
Access Movements—their optional and private nature—are also their
trouble.
As
Séverine
Dusollier
has
noted,
―Creative
Commons . . . plays the game of copyright and does not attempt to
abolish it.‖290 Layering the private contract on top of the private good
―is bound to entail a logic of exclusion that seems to contradict the
ideology of sharing that the Creative Commons scheme advocates.‖291
The message of exclusion and control sent through these licensing
schemes is potentially contrary to the message of inclusion and access
that is intended. Also, these licensing schemes rely on the contracting
party‘s ability to parse and trace complex licensing trails in order to
meaningfully consent to the contract terms and thereafter to put the
resources to use.292 The specter of consent looms large here, as it does
in the origin stories of intellectual-property law. And as with the
notion of autonomy, the Access Movements here appear to depend on
a notion of consent that is more an ideal than a reality. This is not to
suggest that people are convinced by a false consciousness regarding
their own freedom to enter into to Creative Commons licenses to their
detriment. It is to suggest that the notion of ―contract as assent‖ is
more a metaphor than a descriptive state, whether because of
ambiguity, inattention, or complexity. As Michael Madison has
persuasively argued, ―Contract-as-assent is a fiction in the electronic
environment, even when it favors consumers.‖293

289 See, e.g., Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (2010)
(proposing a framework tailoring fair use specifically for technological cases).
290 Dusollier, supra note 191, at 278.
291 Id. at 283 (discussing Niva Elkin-Koren‘s criticism of private ordering in copyright).
292 See Zachary Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An Analysis of Creative Commons
Licensing, 46 IDEA 391, 393–94 (2006) (identifying the tension that exists in licensing
schemes); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private
Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005) (identifying
the limits of licensing platforms). Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, quoting Julia Mahoney, has
called this problem of layered licensing ―the problem of the future.‖ Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 2007, at 23, 36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Julia D. Mahoney,
Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 739 (2002)).
Van Houweling contends that the problem is not with these new ―idiosyncratic property
rights . . . [that are being] redistributed in novel ways‖—what I am calling Access Movement
innovations—but with copyright law itself; specifically the relaxed notice requirement. Id. at 33.
293 Madison, supra note 27, at 463.
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In both case law and organizational development, one can see
reliance on consent as a cornerstone of the Access Movements‘
momentum. The first-sale cases for copyright and patent discussed
above are some examples. Dastar, in terms of reinscribing the liberal
commitment of consumer choice, is another. Some other recent
trademark cases that privilege free speech over nonconfusion—
particularly in the context of parody—overemphasize intentionality of
the speaker and consumer awareness, which is an iteration of the
mutual consent paradigm between manufacturer and consumer.
In Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records,294 Judge Kozinski held for a panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a parodic song
about Mattel‘s Barbie is not dilutive because it is a noncommercial
use and therefore exempt.295 Hailed by many as a welcome limitation
on the very broad dilution cause of action under the Lanham Act, the
decision rests on the unquestioned conclusion that Aqua‘s song
Barbie Girl lampoons Mattel‘s Barbie, and that its expressive
elements are ―inextricably entwined‖ with its commercial purpose.296
Few would doubt that Barbie Girl parodies Barbie (or, as the court
says: the ―song pokes fun at Barbie and the values that Aqua contends
she represents.‖)297 But in a world where the difference between
advertising and art, and between corporate branding and political
speech, is increasingly fuzzy,298 the court‘s assertion of clear line
drawing overstates the case. It is as if simply choosing to see (or hear)
a parodic message in Barbie Girl makes it so. The consumer‘s choice
of interpretative framework, combined with artistic intention, controls
the outcome.
The same might be said of the more recent Haute Diggity Dog
case.299 There, a designer of dog toys allegedly spoofed high-end
designer Louis Vuitton by making dog toys that imitated Louis
Vuitton styles calling them ―Chewy Vuiton.‖300 The court said
confidently, ―[t]he dog toy irreverently presents haute couture as an
object for casual canine destruction. The satire is unmistakable.‖301 In
the context of a confusion-based theory of liability and of dilution, the
294 Mattel,

Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
at 906–07.
296 Id. at 906 (internal quotation marks omitted).
297 Id. at 901 (citing Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ‘g Group, 886 F.2d
490, 495–96 (2d Cir. 1989)).
298 See Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 797 (2010) (describing how branding is ―simultaneously
deeply political and deeply commercial . . . [and] often serve[s] as a powerful organizing
principle for political action‖).
299 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).
300 Id. at 256 (internal quotation marks omitted).
301 Id. at 261.
295 Id.
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court said that the existence of the parody tilted the case in the
defendant‘s favor. The court discounted the very real possibility that
Vuitton could have extended its luxury brand handbags to pet toys,
presumably ignoring the superbrands that populate our global markets
generally and the market for luxury pet products specifically.302 The
court said that the subtle differences between the design of the
parodic product and the Vuitton handbag designs made a big
difference in consumer perception.303 But why? Because the court
ascribes to consumers astute perception and keen interpretive
faculties and to the defendant a clear intent to send a specific
message. The court‘s perception of an unambiguous back-and-forth
between consumer and product manufacturer, a direct conversation
devoid of semantic uncertainty, mimics the aspirations for
unequivocal contract terms and eyes-wide-open assent to them.
Outside of the case law, we might consider the problem of consent
manifesting in organizations that depend on volunteerism. In addition
to the Creative Commons conundrum discussed above, there is the
phenomenon of cloud labor, where people all over the world provide
small, quick tasks online, such as matching words to images or
surveilling real spaces through virtual webcams for free or for
pennies.304 Some people do these tasks being informed of the extent
of their involvement and the reason for the assignment. Many,
however, complete these tasks without any understanding of the end
result of their work, whether they are contributing to a bona fide
database of images or facilitating the identification and capture of
political dissidents.305 Jonathan Zittrain of Harvard‘s Berkman Center
for Internet and Society has questioned whether labor standards,
Internet behavior, and rules governing disclosure should be
considerations in the evolution of our Internet network to prevent
against the possibility of nonconsensual transactions online.306 The
instinct here is that most people believe themselves to be operating
under full knowledge, freely choosing whether or not to work for
pennies. Zittrain persuasively suggests that consent could be a myth
302 See McDonald‘s Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that McDonald‘s prevails on a confusion-based theory of trademark liability
against ―McDental‖ because, in part, it is possible that consumers would believe that the fast
food chain would be in the dental services business). For an example of luxury pet products, see
TRIXIE & PEANUT, INC., http://www.trixieandpeanut.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (selling an
―exclusive collection of stylish designer dog clothes, couture dog carriers, unique pet beds,
designer collars, harnesses + leads and cool dog + cat toys‖).
303 See Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 268.
304 See supra note 164 (describing mechanical turking).
305 See Zittrain, supra note 164, at 28:11, 32:09 (lecturing about cloud computing labor and
giving examples of laboring without full knowledge of the purpose or end result).
306 Id. at 47:14.
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that entrepreneurs (or governments) facilitate in the online world to
augment their power or wealth to the detriment of those who do not
know enough to demand transparency or more equitable terms.
Among his many suggestions, Zittrain calls for more disclosure
and for regulatory floors. Theoretically, consent can be perfected
through better information and equalizing bargaining positions. But
the more consent is demanded—with viral licenses, click agreements,
or otherwise—the more information and diverse bargaining platforms
become necessary to achieve meaningful consent. There is no end to
this race.307 Again, I ask: What is to be done? Giving up on private
ordering would require relinquishing a cherished act—the act of
consent—that itself nourishes autonomy, contingent or otherwise.308
Giving up on consent is unlikely, especially in light of its deep roots
in U.S. jurisprudential theory. Indeed, if our goal as members of the
Access Movements is to explore and commit to shared values
regarding equality and sustainable welfare levels, establishing consent
to those commitments and the means to achieve them might secure
their durability. The question therefore remains: how do we assure
that the consent achieved today to bind intellectual-property relations
in the future is not just a story we tell about those commitments to
attain compliance to them? Learning to identify the stories as distinct
from or the same as our experience of material reality is a good first
step.309
Some lessons may be learned from recent social movements
regarding the allure of consent—or ―choice‖—and how, if left
unproblematized by advocates, it can become a double-edged sword.
Consider the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s in the United
States and its success in constitutionalizing reproductive choice.310
307 Even

Zittrain seems to admit this at the end of the lecture. See id. at 50:45.
COHEN, supra note 83 (manuscript ch. 5, at 95) (―Within the framework of liberal
political theory, . . . . the autonomous self is definitionally capable of both choice and consent,
and so we can say that autonomy subsists both in those choices and in the larger trajectory that
they establish.‖).
309 ―We must think things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words
into the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true.‖ Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Law and Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899); see also
CAROL M. ROSE, supra note 70, at 37 (‖[C]lassic theories of property turned to narrative
[functions] at crucial moments . . . [to] explain[] the origin of property regimes, where the need
for cooperation is most obvious. Th[ese] narrative stories allowed [property theorists] to slide
smoothly over the cooperative gap in their systematic analyses of self-interest.‖); id. at 38 (―It is
the story that fills the gap in the classical theory, and that, as Hayden White might put it, makes
property ‗plausible.‘ Narrative gives us a smooth tale of property as an institution that could
come about through time, effort, and above all, cooperative choices.‖ (footnote omitted)).
310 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to privacy, which includes the right to terminate a
pregnancy).
308 See
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The feminist movement sustains itself in large part with its rhetoric of
choice and consent—that women should be able to choose for
themselves the lives they wish to lead, whether as mothers and/or
career professionals. The argument is this: becoming a mother has
such overwhelming consequences—physiological, psychological and
economic—that no woman should be forced into maternity without
knowingly accepting its consequences.311 One problem with this
―consent‖ model is that once motherhood is chosen, women are
perceived to have signed up for two shifts, the day shift at the office
and the ―second shift‖ at home.312 To be sure, it is better for women to
choose their paths than to have their paths chosen by others;313 but
underneath the rhetoric of choice is the inflexibility of the terms of
the deal. ―Choice‖ means working twice as hard as men.
Another problem with this ―consent‖ model in the feminist
movement is that it naturalizes the inequality between men and
women, such that any choice women realistically have concerns
whether or not to become mothers, not the structure of parenting
itself.314 Why, exactly, is motherhood so difficult psychologically and
economically? And why isn‘t fatherhood precisely as hard (biological
birth aside)?
Admitting to the asymmetry of parenting and building consent
onto that asymmetry does little for women‘s equality. Why should
becoming a mother mean that the mother—and not the father—
reduces work hours to accommodate child-care needs? Workplaces
that facilitate leave and flextime for mothers and not for fathers
perpetuate a double standard. Women are ―accommodated‖ with parttime office schedules, part-time pay, and are nonetheless saddled with
a more-than-full-time work load. This is the ―reward‖ women reaped
from the feminist movement‘s facilitation of women‘s choice to be
311 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (―The
mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that
only she must bear. . . . Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist . . . upon
its own vision of the woman‘s role . . . .‖).
312 See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT (2003 ed. 2003); Edmond L.
Andrews, Survey Confirms It: Women Outjuggle Men, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2004, at A23.
313 But see Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (denying Myra
Bradwell the ability to pursue a career as a lawyer because, under Illinois law, women were
deemed not competent to enter into contracts and because ―[t]he paramount destiny and mission
of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother‖).
314 The impetus behind The Second Shift was Hochschild‘s experience as ―a new mother in
the first flush of the feminist revolution . . . [when, as] a professor of sociology at the University
of California, [she] kept her infant in a small box at her Berkeley office, so she could nurse and
care for the baby during work hours. As one frustrating meeting with a student was repeatedly
interrupted by the squalling baby, Ms. Hochschild recalls wondering, ‗Where, after all, were the
children of my male colleagues?‘‖ Robert Kuttner, She Minds the Child, He Minds the Dog,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1989, at BR3 (reviewing The Second Shift).
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both mothers and career professionals. But women do not really
choose to work two shifts for half the pay; for most, it is an unspoken
take-it-or-leave-it deal.
What can we learn from this comparison of the consent myth of
intellectual property to the choice rhetoric of the feminist movement?
We must learn to dig deeply to expose the terms of the deal. What
looks like consent might be accommodation; it might be a lopsided
compromise. Though called consent by those who benefit from the
deal, it may be more like a contract of adhesion. It must become
second nature to question the assertions that terms are inevitable or
inflexible (or ―natural,‖ in the language of the antifeminist stance.)315
This will help make consent more meaningful in the long run because
the pressure will succeed at clarifying or even altering the terms
themselves.
C. A Third Way
If language is constitutive of community, changing the language
from exclusivity to sharing and from individuality to community
should alter the way we think and act towards each other in terms of
our property relations. The problem is that the Access Movements fail
to discard central idealized tenets of the old system in the process of
renovation. This may be strategic. Or it may be unconscious. Given
the failure of revolutionary movements in the past to succeed when
their language of revolution was too far afield from familiar territory,
the Access Movements‘ holding tight to some aspects of the old
makes sense if durable change is sought.316
Inscribing core principles from the past into a modified language
of intellectual-property access might enable incremental change that
is more sustainable over the long run.317 But, it may not lead to the
change the Access Movements seek: the redistribution of intellectualproperty rights and a flexibility of access to them. 318 Discerning
which old values are necessary to retain in order to achieve ample
315 See

Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141.
the European Revolutions of 1848, after which political anarchists and
socialists agitated for control and failed to achieve any lasting power. CHARLES BREUNIG AND
MATTHEW LEVINGER, THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA, 1789–1850 294–96 (2nd ed. 2002). Some
think their failure lies in their near complete opposition to the established order. The political
anarchists‘ and socialists‘ failure to share some common ground with the past from which they
were breaking might have been experienced as too wrenching, too unfamiliar to be sustainable.
Id. at 295 (characterizing the effect of the 1848 revolutions as ―realism‖ that ―resulted in a more
sober evaluation‖ of capacity for revolutionary change).
317 See generally TUSHNET, supra note 270 (discussing the NAACP‘s legal strategy
leading to Brown v. Board of Education).
318 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 312, at 280 (discussing the feminist movement and its
failure to achieve gender equality in the home).
316 Consider
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support for future changes may be a twenty-twenty hindsight
problem. Was it possible to know that the language of individual
rights in the 1960s and 1970s was going to stall the fight for full
equality by precluding a recognition of group rights through
constitutional litigation?319 The language chosen for retention, which
is reflective of the values too precious to discard (be it ―individuality‖
or ―choice‖), may be precisely that which stalls the Movements or
further entrenches opposition.
In both of these examples, judicial decisions were the barometer
for gauging linguistic and narrative shifts. Perhaps this is the wrong
focus for the Access Movements. Change can happen more decisively
through legislative reform. Writing new default rules for intellectualproperty access (with broader exemptions or per se fair-use standards,
for example)320 would accomplish the Access Movements‘ policies
directly and effectively. Toward this end, the Access Movements
might want to lobby Congress, rather than litigate cases. But with
Congress, as with courts, the language that persuades is the language
we already speak; the language which forms the basis of the stories
we already tell. Surely, new facts and circumstances may shift the
rules slightly—incremental legislative reform is possible, as is
incremental common-law evolution—but absent a monumental crisis,
legislative sea changes are rare.321
So where does that leave us if change is what we seek and drastic
discursive shifts are unlikely to take hold? Scholars of movementframing and collective-action discourse suggest two paradigms. One
is where ―activists or social movement organizations
(SMOs) . . . [create] frames that provide a compelling sense of
injustice and the collective identities for the protagonists and their
targets. Frames offer a diagnosis and prognosis of a problem and a
call to action for its resolution.‖322 This analysis ―focuses on the
social
construction
of
meaning
by . . . activists
and
organizations . . . and the reactions between framers and potential
supporters.‖323
319 See Friedman, supra note 279, at 37 (contrasting the civil rights movement as a
movement for groups with the United States‘ culture of individualism).
320 See William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267,
2303–20 (2010) (proposing a set of per se fair-use standards for trademark law).
321 See, e.g., BREST ET AL., supra note 271, at 499 n.1 (describing the New Deal legislation
as a reaction to the Great Depression). But cf. id. at 933 (describing the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as a response to the slow pace of desegregation, to President John F.
Kennedy‘s assassination and to President Lyndon Johnson‘s landslide victory).
322 Marc W. Steinberg, The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic Analysis
of Repertoires of Discourse Among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton Spinners, 105 AM. J.
SOC. 736, 737 (1999).
323 Id. at 736.
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Another paradigm is more dialogic. Whereas the first model
depicts framing the movement as ―relatively stable‖ and as ―a largely
uncomplicated process of sending and receiving messages,‖ the
second model describes a ―network[] of messages‖ with ―inherent
ambiguities‖ which ―themselves impose structured constraints on
what can be represented.‖324 Whereas the first model conceives of
movement actors as strategic agents, the second model understands
―collective action discourse [a]s contextual, public, and emergent.‖325
Compared to the ―frames‖ of the first model, the second model
describes the movement discourse as a repertoire: ―[L]earned cultural
creations . . . [that] do not descend from abstract philosophy . . . [but]
emerge in struggle.‖326 Because discourse can never be truly
controlled (in terms of its meaning or message) ―nor even presumed
to have a stable value or utility,‖ the first model is idealistic.327 The
second model is rooted in practice. And it is where the Access
Movements seem to be gaining most traction: in the emerging
practices of institutions that are reacting to old ways and new
demands. Marc Steinberg calls this ―talk and back talk in contentious
action.‖328
Consider the successful changes on the side of access in the past
ten years that appear to arise within this second model of ―talk and
back talk.‖ They are neither case driven nor in the nature of
legislative reforms. Instead, they are policy changes within existing
institutions, or they are new organizations that link to existing
institutions to facilitate systemic change.329 As to the former, consider
the National Institute of Health‘s open-access policy, begun
controversially in 2008, which requires that scientists provide public
access to research funded with federal monies.330 Consider also the
university policies that are moving toward open licensing to provide
more access to research results.331 As to the new organizations,
consider the burgeoning of open-access archives and institutional
324 Id.

at 739–40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
at 742.
326 Id. at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CHARLES TILLY, POPULAR
CONTENTION IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1758–1834, at 42 (1995)).
327 Id. at 754.
328 Id. at 772.
329 I am grateful to Michael Madison for many of the ideas in this paragraph.
330 See Soulskill, New Bill Would Repeal NIH Open Access Policy, SLASHDOT (Feb. 14,
2009, 9:32 AM), http://news.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=09/02/14/1319259; Peter Suber, The
Conyers Bill is Back, OPEN ACCESS NEWS (Feb. 4. 2009, 11:54 AM),
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/2009/02/conyers-bill-is-back.html.
331 See Kapczynski et al., supra note 221, at 1039 (arguing for the potential of public sector
institutions, such as universities, to bridge the access and research and development gap through
open licensing practices).
325 Id.
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repositories, independent archives or those linked to larger institutions
that facilitate access of all sorts of research and writing.332 Consider
the growing dominance of Creative Commons and their licensing
scheme, which, after only seven years of existence, estimates the
numbers of its licenses at 130 million.333 Each of these organizational
entities is a form of ―back talk,‖ a kind of challenge to the old regime,
but one that does not ―stand completely outside the meanings
imposed by dominant genres and fields.‖334 Perhaps for this reason,
these organizations‘ in-between status, which is also oppositional,
succeeds at establishing a ―moral integrity.‖335 Contrary to the court
cases, which are often narrow victories and limited to particular
circumstances, and legislative reform, which can take decades and
require a perfect confluence of political factors, institutional
transformation or institutional founding can occur readily with small
numbers of individuals and relatively small capital output.336 The
catch is that these changes happen in situ—already in relation to an
organizational structure or constraint (e.g., the NIH or the University).
But when ―culture [is] in contention‖ as it is in terms of the Access
Movements and intellectual property‘s future, truly engaging with the
situation may be the best way to be heard.
CONCLUSION
I have asserted that the traditional intellectual-property analysis
instantiates social, political and economic hierarchies, in both form
and substance, by appealing to the importance of origins. I have also
asserted that the countermobilization to the expansion of our
intellectual-property system dismantles these hierarchies by
reordering values and discarding certain assumptions embedded in
legal narratives of intellectual property (of sacred beginnings, human
nature, incentives), which reproduce existing property relations to the
benefit of those already empowered.337 By studying past stories of
intellectual-property creation, and comparing those stories to the
332 For a directory of open access archives, see OPENDOAR: DIRECTORY OPEN ACCESS
REPOSITORIES, http://www.opendoar.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2010); REGISTRY OPEN ACCESS
REPOSITORIES (ROAR), http://roar.eprints.org/content.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
333 See History, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about/history (last
visited Oct. 30, 2010) (noting that in 2008 there were an ―[e]stimated 130 million CC licensed
works‖).
334 Steinberg, supra note 322, at 753.
335 Id.
336 For this theory of ―structuration,‖ see ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1984).
337 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 298, at 470 (―[T]he laws of intellectual property are
structured to perpetuate, rather than disable, the current state of gender inequity in the content
industries.‖).
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discourse of the Access Movements today, we notice a difference in
language pointing to a difference in how we constitute ourselves as
creators and innovators in the digital age.
This Article describes the language of the Access Movements as
embracing a collective notion of creation and an ethos of sharing that
is fueled by a diversity of motives that shape the development and use
of intellectual property in order to promote sustainable progress. The
Access Movements react to the perceived expansionist intellectualproperty law by raising awareness of, and appreciation for, a
protected commons and the public domain. When working properly,
this public domain promotes optimal levels of progress through the
practical access for all, a substantive-equality approach to intellectualproperty wealth. For the most part, the Access Movements seek a
well-regulated commons,338 a managed system of individual and
collective rights that promotes social welfare as measured by
community sustainability and practical opportunities for personal
fulfillment.
Despite the Access Movements‘ devotion to a new future for
intellectual-property relations, at least two core concepts from the
origin stories of intellectual property remain: idealizations of
autonomy and consent. These concepts are not left unquestioned, but
they nonetheless play central roles in the countermobilization. The
question remains whether these concepts and the liberal legal politics
they instantiate will frustrate the Access Movements‘ goal of
reversing the expansion of exclusive rights. In light of past social
movements‘ incremental successes through subtle discursive shifts,
relying on a new language to bring a new future may be an effort in
vain. Instead, new values may more readily transform the old if we
engage within existing institutions or partner with new ones.
Retaining the values of autonomy and consent, therefore, may be
necessary. But we must be careful to speak of these values in less
than idealized forms (as modified, contingent or contextual) in order
to shift the debate in the directions the Access Movements seek.
Insofar as law and culture are part and parcel of each other, the
future of intellectual-property law is a matter of cultural politics.339 As
it has in the past, intellectual-property law will shape communities
(who is in and who is out), their values (what is good and what is
338 See Boyle, supra note 1, at 66 (―To put it bluntly, some of the theorists of the ecommons do not see restraints on use as anathematic to the goal of freedom; indeed, they may
see a successful commons as defined by its restraints.‖).
339 Sunder, supra note 7, at 285 (―Rather than narrowly viewing intellectual property as
incentives-for-creation, we must understand intellectual property as social and cultural
relations.‖).
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not), and their capacities to survive and flourish. Attention to the
discourse of the Access Movements can help designate the
communities and values called into being through their law reform
proposals. It also helps identify continuity with past legal orders,
continuity that may or may not be intentional and may or may not be
productive of progressive change. The comparative tales of origins
and access of intellectual property is a dialogue—a ―talk and a back
talk‖—that is forming the basis of new, productive organizations and
instigating transformations within existing ones hopefully to our
collective benefit. Paying close attention to the words we use and the
stories they form is not an exercise in vain. It is how we make sense
of our world to choose the right path from the wrong one.

